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ABSTRACT 
This Article highlights an important shift occurring in the analytical framework used to assess the 
constitutional validity of abortion related laws.  Specifically, the Article analyzes the adoption by 
lower courts of a significant modification to the undue burden analysis developed by Justice 
O’Connor in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.  As described by 
Justice O’Connor, the undue burden analysis focuses on the purpose or legislative basis of an 
abortion related law, and the effect of the law.  If the law is reasonably related to a legitimate state 
interest, it should be upheld unless the effect of the law presents a substantial obstacle to a woman’s 
liberty interest in being able to legally decide to have an abortion before viability.  Lower courts 
have recently introduced a balancing inquiry into the Casey analysis, at least as to an abortion 
related law enacted to serve state interests in health and safety, e.g., laws designed to prevent the 
potential for substandard care in the context of abortion.  The balancing affects both steps of the 
Casey analysis.  In assessing the legislative basis for the law, courts are requiring empirical proof 
that the law furthers state interests, and also are assessing the extent to which the interests are 
likely to be advanced.  In assessing the effect of the law, a finding that the state has not produced 
sufficient empirical evidence showing a strong relationship between the law and state interests 
triggers a diminution of the concept of substantial obstacle.  Courts adopting this balancing 
approach have advanced a number of theories in support of its use, which largely draw on aspects 
of Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart.  This Article assesses the merits of the theories and concludes 
that, although a refinement to the traditional understanding of the Casey analysis is appropriate, 
the balancing approach has no support in Supreme Court precedent and represents a move back 
toward aspects of abortion jurisprudence rejected by a clear majority of the Court in Casey. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey1 represents 
an important point in the American experience with legalized abor-
tion.  A majority of the Court, seven Justices, agreed that Roe v. Wade2 
and its progeny had failed to strike the appropriate balance between 
a woman’s interest in terminating a pregnancy and legitimate state 
interests arising from the fact that abortion is an act “fraught with 
consequences for others.”3  Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 
had opened the door to abortion on demand and substantially closed 
the door to state legislative efforts relating to abortion, whether to 
encourage continuation of a pregnancy and preservation of the life 
of the unborn, to help ensure safe abortion procedures or responsi-
ble abortion providers, to ensure the integrity of the medical profes-
sion, or to prompt public dialogue that may contribute to better un-
derstanding of abortion procedures or medical advances related to 
abortion.4  The Justices in Casey sought to modify abortion jurispru-
 
 1 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 2 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating Texas statutes criminalizing abortion). 
 3 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.  Three Justices joined the plurality opinion adopting what has be-
come known as the undue burden analysis, id. at 869–79 (O’Connor, J., joined by Kenne-
dy & Souter, JJ.); and four Justices joined an opinion concurring in the judgment and 
dissenting in part.  Id. at 944–79 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas, 
JJ.) (explaining that Roe should be overruled, and that state regulation of abortion should 
be reviewed using the same approach used to assess laws arguably infringing on a pro-
tected liberty interest). 
 4 The majority in Roe characterized a woman’s right to decide to abort a pregnancy as 
“fundamental” and required that state interests be “compelling” to justify regulation.  410 
U.S. at 155.  The majority also adopted a very narrow view of when those state interests 
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dence in a way that would better accommodate laws furthering legit-
imate state interests, but did not agree on the proper way to accom-
plish that objective.  Although seven Justices backed away from view-
ing the right recognized in Roe as fundamental, characterizing it 
instead as “some freedom to terminate a pregnancy,” only three Jus-
tices joined Part IV of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion, which 
set out a new analysis for assessing the permissibility of state laws re-
lating to abortion.5 
 
would be sufficiently compelling to justify restrictions on abortion.  An interest in preser-
vation and protection of maternal health was deemed sufficiently compelling only after 
the first trimester, and an interest in human life was deemed sufficiently compelling only 
at viability.  Id. at 162–63.  In Bolton, the Court further impeded the ability of state legisla-
tures to foster interests in the health of the mother, the life of the unborn, or medical 
standards.  410 U.S 179 (1973).  The state law at issue in Bolton restricted abortion except 
when the physician, “based upon his best clinical judgment,” decided the procedure is 
“necessary.”  Id. at 183.  Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion rejected the challengers’ claim 
that the provision was unconstitutionally vague, finding that it allowed the physician am-
ple freedom to exercise professional or clinical judgment, i.e., the provision would allow 
the physician freedom to take into account whatever factors the physician deemed ap-
propriate in the exercise of “medical judgment, properly and professionally exercised.”  
Id. at 191.  Justice Blackmun expressly noted:   
 
  The medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, emo-
tional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the 
patient.  All these factors may relate to health.  This allows the attending physician 
the room he needs to make his best medical judgment.  And it is room that operates 
for the benefit, and not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman. 
 
   Id. at 192.  Because the decision upheld the challenged abortion law, its negative impact 
on a state’s ability to restrict abortion was not immediately apparent.  However, as a con-
sequence of this aspect of Bolton, an exception from abortion restrictions for the health of 
the mother—which the Court in Roe required even after viability—has become a vehicle 
for abortion on demand.  The decisions rendered unenforceable all of the existing abor-
tion laws across all fifty states.  In the period prior to Roe, the process of state-by-state 
modification of state abortion laws had been spurred by recent promulgation of model 
abortion laws.  However, the legislation struck down in Roe was representative of abortion 
laws that had been in existence for a number of decades, and the legislation struck down 
in Bolton was representative of the newer wave of abortion regulation.  Together, Roe and 
Bolton required all states to start over—and to enact legislation consistent with Roe’s tri-
mester/viability framework and Doe’s broad view of the scope of freedom that a woman 
and her physician must decide whether an abortion is health-related.  For a comprehen-
sive explanation of the Roe decision, the decision-making process leading to the decision, 
and its consequences, see CLARKE D. FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION (2013). 
 5 See supra note 3.  Justice O’Connor penned the primary opinion.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 
843–902.  Part I of the Court’s opinion is a summary of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, ex-
plaining that the “essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again re-
affirmed” and pronouncing Justice O’Connor’s view of the three-part essential holding of 
Roe.  Id. at 846.  Part II of the Court’s opinion purports to explain why a woman’s “deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy” is a protected liberty interest.  Id.  Part III of the Court’s 
opinion explains why adhering to the concept of stare decisis is appropriate.  Id. at 854.  
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Under the Casey analysis, generally called the undue burden anal-
ysis, laws regulating abortion are permissible if they further legitimate 
state interests and do not impose a substantial obstacle in the path of 
a woman seeking an abortion.6  As predicted by Justice Antonin Scal-
ia, the undue burden analysis has proven to be difficult to apply.7  
Lower courts are adopting differing approaches as to a number of is-
sues, leading to variable and difficult to reconcile results.  One key 
issue the cases have highlighted is the extent to which the analysis—at 
least as to an abortion-related law enacted to serve state interests in 
health and safety—includes a weighing of the extent to which the law 
advances the state interest and, if not sufficiently substantial, a dimi-
nution of the substantial obstacle standard.  The approach signifi-
cantly changes the analysis.  Rather than a standard threshold, the 
concept of substantial obstacle becomes a moving target or, if the 
view of Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
is correct—that “[t]he feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the 
burden, even if slight, to be ‘undue’ . . . .”8—a meaningless standard. 
Judge Posner’s endorsement of this new approach, referred to 
herein as the “Balancing Approach,” represents a definite and signifi-
cant shift in abortion jurisprudence.9  Further, despite the significant 
modification to the traditional understanding of the Casey analysis (or 
perhaps because of it), lower courts seem eager to embrace the Bal-
ancing Approach.  Their embrace is reflected in several recent judi-
cial opinions addressing the constitutionality of state laws having 
practical effects on the ability to easily obtain an abortion.10  This Ar-
 
Justice O’Connor explains that it is the combined considerations of the correctness of 
Roe’s decision to characterize the right as a protected liberty interest and the force of stare 
decisis in this particular context which outweigh arguments to overrule Roe.  Id. at 860, 
869.  Part IV is a plurality opinion, and it is in Part IV that Justice O’Connor adheres to 
some aspects of the decision in Roe and jettisons others, and articulates a new approach to 
analyzing state restrictions on abortion.  Id. at 869–79.  Part V involves application of Jus-
tice O’Connor’s approach to assessing state regulation of abortion.  Id. at 879. 
 6 See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
 8 Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014). 
 9 Circuit court decisions prior to Van Hollen did not apply the approach.  See, e.g., Green-
ville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r S.C. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Control, 317 F.3d 357, 363 
(4th Cir. 2002); Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Cnty., Inc. v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377, 1381 
(8th Cir. 1989). 
 10 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding 
that the burden on women seeking abortion outweighs the strength of Arizona’s justifica-
tion for its law); Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 
(M.D. Ala. 2014) (deciding, after a ten-day trial, that the challenged state law created a 
substantial obstacle for women seeking abortions);  Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. 
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ticle highlights the theories advanced by courts in support of the Bal-
ancing Approach, and analyzes them in light of a careful reading of 
the most relevant Supreme Court precedent, namely, the Casey deci-
sion and the decision in Gonzales v. Carhart.11  Careful scrutiny 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court cases do not support the Bal-
ancing Approach.  Indeed, adopting the Balancing Approach in real-
ity constitutes a move back toward aspects of abortion jurisprudence 
abandoned by seven Justices in Casey.  Further, in adopting the Bal-
ancing Approach, lower courts are side-stepping important issues de-
serving full analysis before invalidating state laws furthering legiti-
mate state interests. 
I.  THE CASEY ANALYSIS 
The Court in Casey did not overrule Roe v. Wade, in part because of 
an expansive view of the nature of a woman’s interest relating to the 
question whether to terminate a pregnancy,12 and in part because of 
concern that acknowledging an error would erode respect for the 
Supreme Court and concern about upsetting people’s reliance on 
ready access to abortion.13  However, a majority of the Court agreed 
that important state interests exist that would justify greater govern-
ment regulation of access to abortion, abortion procedures, and 
abortion providers and facilities, and a majority agreed that changes 
to abortion jurisprudence were necessary and appropriate to better 
accommodate government initiatives enacted to serve legitimate state 
interests.14  The Court in Casey expressly overruled aspects of some 
prior Supreme Court decisions15 and upheld several state law re-
 
v. Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (resolving parties’ motions for summary 
judgment, and deciding a trial was warranted on Planned Parenthood’s undue burden 
claim); Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 
2015), order modified, 790 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Planned Parenthood of the 
Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Medicine, 865 N.W.2d 252, 263–64 (2015) (following the 
view of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits). 
 11 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 12 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–53 (Part II of the opinion). 
 13 Id. at 854–69 (Part III of the opinion). 
 14 Id. at 869–79 (Part IV of the opinion).  Although only three Justices joined Part IV of the 
opinion, four other Justices clearly agreed with these propositions, as they would have 
overruled Roe, thereby allowing states to enact laws rationally related to legitimate state 
interests.  See id. at 944–79 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in 
part). 
 15 See Thornburgh v. Amer. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (discuss-
ing cases that “are inconsistent with Roe’s statement that the State has a legitimate interest 
in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn”); id. at 875 (noting that the Court 
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strictions on abortion:  a law requiring a physician to provide in-
formed consent twenty-four hours before performing an abortion;16 a 
law prohibiting (except in a medical emergency) an abortion per-
formed on an unemancipated eighteen year old without informed 
consent of at least one parent or a finding by a court that the woman 
is mature and capable of giving informed consent;17 and various rec-
ord keeping and reporting requirements.18 
In the main opinion, written by Justice O’Connor, the Court ad-
hered to some aspects of the decision in Roe and jettisoned others.  
On the one hand, Justice O’Connor purported to adhere to the “es-
sential” holding of Roe, including the proposition that the Constitu-
tion of the United States affords a woman some freedom to terminate 
her pregnancy.19  Also, in Part IV (the plurality opinion) Justice 
O’Connor retained Roe’s principle that viability is a key point in a 
pregnancy; meaning that post-viability a state’s interest in preserving 
and respecting human life would support a ban on abortion (as long 
as an exception exists to protect the health and life of a woman). 20 
On the other hand, the Court departed from other principles set 
out in Roe—albeit under the guise of giving effect to a part of Roe that 
had been given “too little acknowledgement and implementation by 
the Court” in cases subsequent to Roe.21  Justice O’Connor focused in 
part on those sentences in the Roe decision that acknowledge the 
state’s “important and legitimate interest in potential life.”22  In Roe, 
Justice Harry Blackmun explicitly held that the state interest in po-
tential life would not justify any regulation of abortion until the point 
of viability.23  Justice O’Connor departed from this diminished view of 
the state interest in human life, noting that: 
Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and 
regulations designed to encourage [a woman] to know that there are 
philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to 
bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are 
procedures and institutions to allow [for] adoption of unwanted children 
 
has struck down laws that “in no real sense deprived women of the ultimate decision”); 
505 U.S. at 882 (overruling aspects of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416 (1983). 
 16 505 U.S. at 881–87. 
 17 Id. at 899–900. 
 18 Id. at 900–01. 
 19 Id. at 869. 
 20 Id. at 846, 870. 
 21 Id. at 871. 
 22 Id. at 871 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163). 
 23 See 410 U.S. at 163. 
Dec. 2015] CASEY’S UNDUE BURDEN TEST 663 
 
as well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to 
raise the child herself.24 
Justice O’Connor also departed from Roe’s diminished view of a 
state’s important and legitimate interest in health and safety, which 
Roe deemed sufficiently compelling only after the first trimester—
erroneously believing that, until that time, “mortality in abortion may 
be less than mortality in normal childbirth.”25  Again, seven Justices 
agreed with the need to abandon these aspects of Roe. 
The heightened view of the importance of legitimate state inter-
ests necessarily required abandonment of Roe’s trimester framework.26  
Justice O’Connor noted the contradictory nature of the analysis in 
Roe:  because the trimester framework had forbidden any regulation 
designed to further maternal health until the end of the first tri-
mester, and any regulation designed to promote the state interest in 
unborn human life before viability, it was incompatible with Roe’s 
recognition that those interests exist throughout pregnancy.27  Aban-
donment of the trimester framework in-turn required re-articulation 
of how to assess whether state regulation bearing on pre-viability 
abortion is a permissible or impermissible infringement of a woman’s 
protected liberty interest.  For this purpose, Justice O’Connor created 
what has become known as the undue burden analysis.  Justice 
O’Connor explained: 
Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of 
increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether 
for abortion or any other medical procedure.  The fact that a law which 
serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has 
the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to 
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.  Only where the 
state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make 
this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liber-
ty protected by the Due Process Clause.28 
 
 24 505 U.S. at 872. 
 25 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 875–76, 878; Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63; see also Byron Calhoun, The Ma-
ternal Mortality Myth in the Context of Legalized Abortion; Systematic Review, 80 THE LINACRE 
QUARTERLY 264 (2013) (detailing a number of factors making abortion-related data and 
maternal mortality data unreliable and concluding that flawed techniques have produced 
an overestimation of maternal mortality and an underestimation of abortion mortality). 
 26 Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (“The trimester framework suffers from these basic flaws:  in its 
formulation it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice 
it undervalues the State’s interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.”). 
 27 Id. at 876. 
 28 Id. at 874. 
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. . . A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that 
a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obsta-
cle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.29 
. . . What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, 
not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.  Regulations which 
do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or 
the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the 
life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to 
the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.  Unless it has that effect on 
her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose 
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal.  
Regulations designed to foster the health of the woman seeking an abor-
tion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.30 
The analysis envisioned by Justice O’Connor thus consists of an in-
quiry into purpose and effect:  a relational inquiry focusing on the 
purpose of the law and whether the law is reasonably related to a val-
id state interest, e.g., the life of the unborn child, or the health and 
safety of the mother; and an inquiry focusing on whether the effect of 
the law is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek-
ing a previability abortion.31  Justice O’Connor also provided some 
basic benchmarks:  increased cost or practical difficulties indirectly 
resulting from laws do not constitute a substantial obstacle; rather, a 
finding of substantial obstacle turns on an effect more directly im-
pacting a woman’s interest in legally deciding to abort, i.e., an effect 
on the decision making process itself.32 
Although a majority of the Court agreed with these benchmarks, 
the undue burden analysis itself did not garner the support of a ma-
jority of the Court.  Two Justices would have adhered to the strict 
scrutiny analysis set in play with the decision in Roe.33  Four other Jus-
 
 29 Id. at 877. 
 30 Id. at 877–78 (internal citations removed). 
 31 See infra Part IV for a discussion of why this way of framing of the Casey analysis is accurate 
and should be adopted. 
 32 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (emphasizing that an impermissible burden is one that effects “a 
woman’s ability to make [the] decision”); see also id. at 875 (noting the past error of strik-
ing down laws that “in no real sense deprived women of the ultimate decision”); id. at 
887–98 (Part V(C) of the opinion) (invalidating a spousal notification provision because, 
at least for women who feared domestic violence, the provision’s effect on a woman’s abil-
ity to decide to abort was tantamount to a ban on abortion). 
 33 Id. at 934 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Roe’s requirement of 
strict scrutiny as implemented through the trimester framework should not be disturbed.  
No other approach has gained a majority, and no other is more protective of the woman’s 
fundamental right.”); see also id. at 912–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(opining that “the Casey joint opinion represents the holding of the Court in that case”) 
(citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that, when “no single 
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tices, however, would have simply overruled Roe and would review 
state regulation of abortion using the same approach used to assess 
laws arguably infringing on a protected liberty interest, i.e., a form of 
rational basis review.34 
This later group of Justices also pointed out problematic aspects 
of the undue burden analysis.  Justice Scalia noted that it is a stand-
ard without pedigree, i.e., it was “created largely out of whole cloth” 
as a way to avoid the barriers to reasonable state regulation of abor-
tion without overruling Roe.35  Moreover, precisely because it was 
“plucked from nowhere,” he predicted that the standard would not 
provide a tool for appropriately cabining judicial discretion:  “the 
question of what is a ‘substantial obstacle’ to abortion will undoubt-
edly engender a variety of conflicting views.”36  Pointing to the diver-
gent opinions in the Casey decision itself as to the abortion regula-
tions at issue, Chief Justice William Rehnquist similarly noted that the 
undue burden standard would fail to restrain judges from relying on 
subjective preferences:  that is, similar to the Roe decision itself, the 
undue burden standard would allow a court—and ultimately the Su-
preme Court—to impart its own preferences on the states under the 
guise of the Constitution.37  Justice Scalia agreed, noting that the 
standard was but a “verbal shell game [concealing] raw judicial policy 
choices concerning what is ‘appropriate’ abortion legislation.”38 
Nonetheless, the decision in Casey clearly revealed a majority of 
the Justices departing from Roe’s principle that a woman’s freedom to 
decide to have an abortion is a fundamental right triggering a strict-
scrutiny type of analysis.  Further, although preserving in some re-
spects the abortion on demand aspect of Roe and Bolton (due to the 
health exception requirement), the majority in Casey viewed states as 
having legitimate interests justifying regulation of the provision of 
abortion services—including regulations applicable during the first 
trimester; and the majority supported an analysis designed to better 
 
rationale” secures the assent of five Justices, “the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds”)). 
 34 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 944, 951–52, 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part) (“A woman’s interest in having an abortion is a form of liber-
ty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in 
ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”) 
 35 Id. at 987 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); see also id. at 964 
(Rehnquist, C..J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 36 Id. at 965 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 37 See id. at 965–66. 
 38 Id. at 987 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
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accommodate state laws reasonably related to legitimate state inter-
ests notwithstanding some negative impact on ready access to abor-
tion services. 
The decision in Gonzales v. Carhart39 confirmed the Court’s greater 
receptivity to legislative efforts to advance legitimate state interests.  
In Gonzales, a majority of the Court rejected a facial challenge to a 
federal ban on use of the procedure known as partial-birth abortion 
(or intact dilation and extraction (“intact D & E”)).40  The Justices 
were able to uphold the law using the principles set out in the Casey 
plurality opinion, but without specifically endorsing Casey’s undue 
burden analysis or its retention of viability as a key factor in assessing 
the permissibility of legislation regulating abortion.41  The Court used 
the undue burden analysis to frame the decision, but the outcome 
hinged on two distinct aspects of the Casey decision:  Casey’s confirma-
tion of the need for a health exception, and the recognition that 
abortion jurisprudence must accommodate the government’s legiti-
mate interest in preserving and promoting the life of the unborn.42  
In assessing the effect of the law, the Court focused on the failure to 
include a health exception.  The issue, thus, was whether the ban sub-
jected women to “significant health risks.”43  Because the medical evi-
dence was conflicting as to whether the banned procedure was ever 
genuinely medically necessary, and because a safe alternative method 
remained available, the Court held that the effect of the ban did not 
present a substantial obstacle.44 
Although not endorsing the Casey undue burden analysis, the 
Gonzales decision nonetheless shed light on how courts should apply 
the analysis.  Indeed, some lower courts adopting the Balancing Ap-
proach have pointed to Gonzales as support.  As Part III of this Article 
shows, however, the appropriateness of the Balancing Approach turns 
on a proper reading of both Casey and Gonzales.  First, however, it is 
useful to understand the nature of the Balancing Approach and how 
it impacts judicial review of the constitutionality of state laws relating 
to abortion.  Part IV of the Article highlights the Van Hollen decision 
in which Judge Posner endorsed the Balancing Approach, cases illus-
 
 39 550 U.S. 124, 130 (2007). 
 40 Id. at 133, 167–68 (emphasizing that the decision was limited to a facial challenge to the 
law). 
 41 Id. at 145–46. 
 42 Id. at 145, 158 (noting that the premise that the state has a legitimate interest in protect-
ing human life from the inception of pregnancy “cannot be set at naught” by Casey’s re-
quirement of a health exception). 
 43 See id. at 161. 
 44 See id. at 161–67. 
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trating that the approach significantly lowers the bar in the substan-
tial obstacle inquiry, and litigation in the Fifth Circuit in which the 
Balancing Approach has been rejected. 
II.  INTRODUCTION TO THE BALANCING APPROACH 
Lower courts applying the Casey analysis have tended to view it as 
consisting of two steps.  Specifically, courts have described the analy-
sis as requiring, first, an assessment of the basis for the law; and, se-
cond, an assessment of whether the law imposes an undue burden—
i.e., whether the purpose or effect of the law places a substantial ob-
stacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.  A study of the 
cases that have explored use of the Balancing Approach shows that 
the Balancing Approach modifies both steps of the analysis, and does 
so in ways that work against the Supreme Court’s efforts to better ac-
commodate legislative efforts to advance legitimate state interests in 
the arena of abortion. 
1.  The Van Hollen Decision 
Judge Posner in 2013 endorsed use of the Balancing Approach in 
the Casey analysis.  In Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Van Hollen, 
abortion-providing clinics challenged a statute prohibiting a physi-
cian from performing an abortion unless the physician has admitting 
privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the clinic in 
which the abortion is performed.45  The district court had granted a 
preliminary injunction, and Judge Posner emphasized the difficult 
balancing involved in making such a decision at the trial court level 
and the deference given to such a decision on appeal.46  Judge Pos-
ner’s decision, however, reflected deference not merely to the district 
court’s findings of fact and discretionary conclusions, but also the 
court’s views of the governing law.  Further, as highlighted by a con-
curring opinion, Judge Posner’s decision represented a break from 
relevant Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, and yet 
Judge Posner provided no rationale for the break and cited no au-
thority. 
The first half of the opinion reads as though it is an assessment of 
Planned Parenthood’s likelihood of success on the merits, which 
turned on whether the Wisconsin law imposed an undue burden on 
 
 45 See 738 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing WIS. STAT. § 940.15(5) (1985)). 
 46 Id. at 795 (explaining the balancing involved in deciding whether to grant a preliminary 
injunction). 
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women.47  Judge Posner began with a conclusion that the law “seems 
bound to have a substantial impact on the practical availability of 
abortion in Wisconsin.”48  This conclusion was grounded in Judge 
Posner’s apparent agreement with a finding made by the district 
court:  that the abortion doctors used by Planned Parenthood would 
have difficulty obtaining admitting privileges.  To support this con-
clusion, Judge Posner pointed to both facts and speculation:  the fact 
that many of Planned Parenthood’s doctors didn’t have admitting 
privileges at hospitals within thirty miles of the clinics and that some 
of the doctors would have to obtain privileges at multiple hospitals;49 
and speculation that some hospitals would not grant privileges to 
doctors who perform abortions, and that it would be difficult for 
abortion doctors to get privileges because relevant factors often in-
clude number of admissions, revenue generated, or other economic 
grounds, which would tend to work against abortion doctors.50  In 
agreeing with the district court, Judge Posner did not address im-
portant issues, e.g., whether the law itself directly caused the “obsta-
cle,” as opposed to the other factors, and why this type of obstacle 
could be sufficient in light of Casey’s benchmarks.51 
Judge Posner next focused on the need for the law, and thus ar-
guably was assessing the relational inquiry aspect of the undue bur-
den analysis.  Here again he simply repeated findings and conclu-
sions made by the district court.  In part he disputed the need for the 
law to be made effective immediately.52  But he also disputed the need 
for the law generally, by focusing on the fact that the state’s concerns 
 
 47 Id. at 791 (explaining the plaintiff’s theory in the appeal of the preliminary injunction). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 791–92.  It is appropriate to characterize this as speculation because the district 
court noted testimonial evidence of state witnesses that cast doubt on the plaintiffs’ alle-
gations.  See Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, No. 13–cv–465–wmc, 
2013 WL 3989238, at *4–5; (W.D. Wis., Aug. 2, 2013).  The district court did not make 
any specific findings of fact about the ultimate ability of plaintiffs’ doctors to obtain ad-
mitting privileges.  See id. at *16–17. 
 51 Indeed, at this point in the opinion Judge Richard Posner did not discuss the legal stand-
ard used to decide whether an impact rises to the level of an undue burden.  See Van 
Hollen, 738 F.3d at 791–93.  In contrast, Judge Daniel Manion began analysis of the undue 
burden prong of the Casey analysis by noting:  “We cannot find the requirement unconsti-
tutional unless the plaintiffs can show that the requirement ‘will have the likely effect of 
preventing a significant number of women for whom the regulation is relevant from ob-
taining abortions.’”  Id. at 804 (Manion, J., concurring) (citing Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 
446, 481 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 52 Id. at 793.  The Wisconsin legislature had enacted the law in mid-June, the governor 
signed the law on July 5th, a Friday, and it was effective the following Monday.  Id. at 788;  
see also id. at 803 (Manion, J., concurring). 
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about continuity of care and qualifications of providers are not lim-
ited to the abortion context, and he suggested that the state had not 
presented evidence showing a link between having admitting privi-
leges and women receiving better care or suffering from fewer com-
plications.53 
In the first half of the opinion, then, Judge Posner concluded that 
Planned Parenthood was likely to succeed on the merits because it 
could prove that the law imposed a substantial obstacle and the state 
could not prove that the law furthered state interests.  Judge Posner 
did not, in this part of the opinion, discuss the legal standards used to 
assess whether a burden rises to the level of substantial obstacle.  Ra-
ther, he simply agreed with the district court’s conclusions that the 
law did impose a substantial obstacle.  The district court’s conclu-
sions, however, depended on the Balancing Approach.  The district 
court focused on the increased distances some women would have to 
travel if some of Planned Parenthood’s clinics closed.54  Given Casey’s 
benchmarks, the court could not convincingly conclude that the 
burden presented a substantial obstacle without changing the stand-
ard—which the court did. 
[T]he court considers these obstacles in access to abortion services [an] 
undue burden in light of the dubious benefits to women’s health [from] 
the admitting privileges restriction . . . . Even if there were some evidence 
that the admitting privileges requirement would actually further women’s 
health, any benefit is greatly outweighed by the burdens caused by in-
creased travel, decreased access and, at least for some women, the denial 
of an in-state option for abortion services.55 
Judge Posner’s agreement with the district court’s conclusions in this 
part of the opinion reflects an implicit endorsement of the trial 
 
 53 Id. at 793, 795.  Here Judge Posner may well have been relying on findings of fact made 
by the district court.  The district court said the state had “failed to establish any credible 
link between admitting privileges at a nearby hospital and furthering continuity of care.”  
See Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *9.  However, the state had presented evidence and 
the trial court also found it was “uncertain at best” whether the law would promote conti-
nuity of care for at least some women who suffered complications following an abortion.  
Id.  The district court also had recognized that the law might promote accountability by 
way of peer review in cases involving mismanaged health care of patient abandonment.  
Id. at *10. 
 54 See id. at at *16–17.  Although the increased distance for these women would be 100 
miles, the trial court and Judge Posner focused on the total miles the women would expe-
rience:  400 miles (100 miles each way, for two trips since Wisconsin also requires clinics 
to provide counseling and an ultrasound at least twenty-four hours before performing an 
abortion).  See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 796.  Notably, the Court in Casey suggested that 
costs associated with doubling a six-hour round trip would not be an undue burden.  See 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 886–87. 
 55 Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *19. 
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court’s view of the law; an endorsement which was made explicit to-
ward the end of the opinion. 
But the opinion is written in such a way that the weighing of in-
terests by Judge Posner occurs as part of the analysis of harms that is 
required in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction—a 
tactic that masks to some extent his endorsement of adding a step to 
the Casey analysis.  That is, in some ways, there is nothing obviously 
novel about his analysis until the end when he abruptly shifts back to 
the Casey analysis and states:  “The cases that deal with abortion-
related statutes sought to be justified on medical grounds require not 
only evidence (here lacking as we have seen) that the medical 
grounds are legitimate but also that the statute not impose an ‘undue 
burden’ on women seeking abortions.”56  After noting that abortion 
statutes justified on medical grounds may not impose an undue bur-
den, he continued: 
The feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the burden, even if slight, 
to be “undue” in the sense of disproportionate or gratuitous.  It is not a 
matter of the number of women likely to be affected. . . . In this case the 
medical grounds thus far presented . . . are feeble, yet the burden great 
because of the state’s refusal to have permitted abortion providers a rea-
sonable time within which to comply.57 
In these few sentences Judge Posner has radically modified the Casey 
analysis.  He injected into the analysis an evidentiary assessment of 
the extent to which an abortion law promotes admittedly legitimate 
state interests in women’s health and, in essence, has lowered the 
standard used in analyzing whether a law presents a “substantial ob-
stacle” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.58 
In addition to endorsing the Balancing Approach, Judge Posner’s 
assessment of the state’s justification for the admitting privileges law 
was nothing short of hostile.  The state had argued that the law pro-
tects the health of women by helping to ensure continuity of care for 
women who suffer complications following an abortion and by oper-
ating as a sort of “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval,” and had 
 
56 See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See id.  The reference to the relevancy of the “number of women likely to be affected” re-
flects Judge Posner’s rejection of the heightened standard used in facial challenges to 
abortion laws.  See id. at 804–05 (Manion, J., concurring in part) (explaining that, in this 
facial challenge to the law, “[w]e cannot find the requirement unconstitutional unless the 
plaintiffs can show that the requirement ‘will have the likely effect of preventing a signifi-
cant number of women for whom the regulation is relevant from obtaining abortions’”; 
and later noting that “more than 70% of women in Wisconsin who seek abortions live in 
the southern counties near Milwaukee and Madison, where clinics will continue operat-
ing” and that “most Wisconsin women seeking abortions can travel to clinics in Illinois”). 
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submitted an affidavit from a qualified physician about a case in 
which admitting privileges likely would have made a difference.59  The 
trial court had explicitly affirmed that credentialing, continuity of 
care, and peer review of abortion procedures “all may further wom-
en’s health,” noting that “each component may better equip physi-
cians to handle complications.”60  Further, the concurring opinion 
pointed out that the admitting privileges law had been enacted within 
weeks of national media attention to the “Gosnell scandal” and that 
the state had submitted evidence of “numerous other examples of 
egregious and substandard care by abortion doctors and clinics” (as 
reflected in the Appendix to the Concurrence).61 
Judge Posner’s response was dismissive and the opinion is filled 
with criticism directed at the state.  He was critical about the legisla-
tive process:  the limited legislative deliberations leading to the law; 
that the legislature was concerned about the quality of care for abor-
tion but allegedly not about other invasive procedures performed 
outside of the hospital; and certain shortcomings in the law (e.g., did 
not require abortion doctors to care for patients with complications, 
and did not distinguish between surgical and medication abortions).62  
He similarly criticized the state’s efforts at trial.  He dismissed argu-
ments about quality of care, pointing to statistics showing very low 
rates of complications requiring hospitalization following abortion,63 
 
 59 Id. at 789, 797. 
 60 See Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *14–15 (arguing that the state had not “connect[ed] 
the dots between these components of quality patient care and the admitting privileges 
requirement” primarily because the state had not produced evidence of a specific case in 
which a doctor’s lack of privileges had been a factor in an abortion patient’s negative 
outcome following complications; the state thereafter provided an affidavit which Judge 
Posner discounted). 
 61 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 802–03, 807–10 (Manion, J., concurring in part) (discussing Gos-
nell scandal); see also id. at 800–04 (highlighting many facts that support the state’s posi-
tion:  a statement related to patient safety issued by the American College of Surgeons 
which includes as one alternative for regulating “office-based surgery” a requirement that 
physicians performing the surgery to have admitting privileges “at a nearby hospital”; the 
fact that the plaintiff had offered no evidence that doctors performing other types of “of-
fice-based surgery” do not have privileges; the parties’ agreement that some abortions re-
sult in complications requiring hospitalization; the fact that hospital credentialing deci-
sions are well-recognized as one means of fostering quality care and thus that “every 
circuit to address the issue has held that admitting privileges requirements further states’ 
legitimate interests”; and the fact that many abortion patients are young and vulnerable 
and thus arguably in greater need of state attention to quality of care provided in “office-
based” clinics).  Judge Manion’s appendix is included as an appendix to this article.  See 
infra Appendix. 
 62 Id. at 789, 798. 
 63 See id. at 797 (pointing to studies showing a 0.05% complication rate for aspiration abor-
tions, and a 0.06% rate for medical abortions). 
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and was dismissive of the state’s concerns about underreporting of 
complications without more evidence.64  Regarding affidavit evidence 
suggesting that a failure to have admitting privileges resulted in poor 
outcomes, he stated:  “one (doubtful) case in 29 years is not impres-
sive evidence of the medical benefits of the Wisconsin statute.”65  As 
recognized by other courts, Judge Posner was looking for empirical 
proof of the efficacy of the law.66  As noted, this assessment occurred 
as part of the “balancing of the harms” issue central to a decision 
about a preliminary injunction and, in that context, evidence bearing 
on the extent to which a law promotes a legitimate state interest ar-
guably is not out of place.  But Judge Posner expressly transplanted 
that assessment into the Casey analysis. 
The concurring opinion highlighted that the analysis was a break 
from both Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent,67 yet, re-
markably, Judge Posner provided no analysis or explanation and cit-
ed to no authority for the modification.68  Despite the undisciplined 
nature of Judge Posner’s opinion in Van Hollen, other courts have fol-
lowed suit.  To their credit, these opinions have tried to do what 
Judge Posner did not:  articulate a line of reasoning that would sup-
port this shift in the Casey analysis.69  Before assessing those theories, 
it is helpful to understand the impact of the Balancing Approach and 
the main arguments against the Balancing Approach. 
2.  Impact of the Balancing Approach 
The Balancing Approach endorsed in Van Hollen affects both steps 
of the Casey analysis.  As to the relational inquiry, Judge Posner dis-
missed the state’s argument that the admitting privileges law ad-
vanced state interests because the state did not make its case with 
 
 64 Id. at 790, 797; see also Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *7 (faulting the state’s witnesses 
for not citing studies to back statistics about underreporting). 
 65 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 797. 
 66 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott II), 
748 F.3d 583, 596 (5th Cir. 2014) (disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s concerns of a 
lack of statistical evidence). 
 67 See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 799 (Manion, J., concurring in part) (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. 
124, 158 (2007); see also Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. 
Abbott (Abbott I), 734 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2013)) (noting that “legislation regulating 
abortions must pass muster under rational basis review—and must not have the ‘practical 
effect of imposing an undue burden’”); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 481 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 68 Id. at 798.  After noting that the Casey analysis involves two distinct steps, Judge Posner 
cites to important Supreme Court cases, including Casey and Stenberg.  Id.  However, there 
is no attempt to tie his modification of the undue burden analysis to the cases. 
 69 See infra Part III. 
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empirical proof.  Further, he assessed not merely whether the law fur-
thered state interests, but also the extent to which the state interests 
were advanced.  Concluding that the justification for the law was 
“feeble,” Judge Posner then modified the substantial obstacle inquiry, 
such that a burden—even if slight—could be found undue.  Alt-
hough the effect of the admitting privileges law at issue seemed anal-
ogous to the indirect obstacles deemed insufficient in Casey—
increased costs and/or practical difficulties—use of the Balancing 
Approach changes the calculus.  Litigation in the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits similarly illustrates that the Balancing Approach significantly 
changes the Casey analysis. 
In Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. Ab-
bott (Abbott I),70 the Fifth Circuit considered a facial challenge by 
Planned Parenthood to an admitting privileges law similar to the law 
at issue in Van Hollen.71  The district court had struck down the Texas 
admitting privileges law, finding that the law lacked a rational basis 
and presented a substantial obstacle.72  In describing the Casey analy-
sis, the district court used language resembling the balancing ap-
proach used in Van Hollen, noting that courts must first “subject regu-
lations to a rational-basis review to determine whether the law’s 
purpose or effect is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest 
balanced with the woman’s interest;” and, if so, according to the court, 
the second prong of the analysis involves assessing the purpose and 
effect of the law, to determine whether it places a substantial obstacle 
before a woman seeking an abortion.73 
Using the standard approach to the Casey analysis, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Abbott I disagreed and stayed the district court’s injunction 
pending appeal.74  Review of the district court’s conclusion that the 
law lacked a rational basis revealed that the district court had applied 
a heightened rational basis standard.  The Fifth Circuit pointed to ev-
idence that the state had presented showing that the admitting privi-
 
 70 Abbott I, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013), motion to vacate stay denied, 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013). 
 71 The Texas law required a physician performing or inducing an abortion to have admit-
ting privileges on the date of the abortion at a hospital no more than thirty miles from 
the location where the abortion is provided.  See Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas 
Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 897–98 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (quoting 
section 2 of House Bill 2, to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
171.0031(a)(1)); see id. at 904 (quoting section 3 of House Bill 2, to be codified at TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.063).  Plaintiffs also challenged a law directing that medi-
cation abortions comply with the FDA approved protocol (and thus precluding the popu-
lar off-label protocol).  Id. at 904–06. 
 72 See id. at 902. 
 73 See id. at 898–99 (emphasis added). 
 74 See Abbott I, 734 F.3d at 409. 
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leges law fostered a woman’s ability to seek consultation and treat-
ment for complications directly from the physician who performed 
the abortion (as opposed to an emergency room provider), and thus 
would help prevent patient abandonment; and evidence showing that 
the law would help ensure that abortion providers were qualified to 
provide high quality care, and thus would help ensure patient safety.75  
The district court had ignored this evidence or found it insufficient 
to show a rational basis for the law.76  The Fifth Circuit emphasized 
the low level of judicial review appropriate in rational basis review, 
noting that a legislative choice “is not subject to courtroom 
factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by 
evidence or empirical data.”77  The court also found the district 
court’s approach to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recog-
nition, in a case upholding a law restricting the performance of abor-
tion to licensed physicians, that “the Constitution gives the States 
broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed 
only by licensed professionals, even if an objective assessment might sug-
gest that those same tasks could be performed by others.”78 
In reviewing the district court’s decision that the admitting privi-
leges law presented a substantial obstacle, the Fifth Circuit began with 
the benchmark established in Casey, namely, that a law that serves a 
valid purpose is not rendered unconstitutional by an incidental effect 
of making it more difficult or expensive to obtain an abortion;79 and 
the court’s analysis focused solely on the effect of the law.  The court 
again focused on evidence the district court had ignored.  The dis-
trict court had focused only on evidence of clinic closings that would 
impact twenty-four counties in the Rio Grande Valley.80  The Fifth 
Circuit focused on evidence that more than 90% of women seeking 
an abortion in Texas would be able to obtain one from a physician 
within 100 miles of their residence.81  Under Casey’s benchmarks this 
 
 75 Id. at 411–12. 
 76 See id. at 411 (explaining that the district court focused on other evidence involving 
emergency room treatment provided to women experiencing complications, i.e., the dis-
trict court focused on the fact that women going to ERs generally receive good medical 
care, but ignored the state’s concern that abortion providers be available to consult their 
patients who suffer complications and the state’s attempt to prevent patient abandon-
ment). 
 77 Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)). 
 78 Id. at 412 (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 973 (1997)). 
 79 Id. at 413 (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–58 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874)). 
 80 Id. at 414. 
 81 Id. at 414–15.  In exploring whether the law presented a substantial burden in a “large 
fraction” of the cases, the Fifth Circuit explained that, because the law applies to any phy-
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effect is not a substantial obstacle.  The Fifth Circuit also noted that 
much of the evidence Planned Parenthood had relied on to show 
that it would not be able to staff its facilities with physicians with ad-
mitting privileges was unrelated to the Texas admitting privileges 
law—and thus not relevant to Casey’s undue burden analysis.82  With-
out the Balancing Approach, which lowers the substantial obstacle 
threshold, the admitting privileges law readily survived the Casey anal-
ysis. 
Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble,83 illustrates even more 
dramatically the impact of the Balancing Approach.  The case in-
volved a facial challenge to an Arizona law requiring medication-
induced abortions to be administered in compliance with protocol 
outlined in the FDA approved label for the medication.84  The law was 
aimed at use of RU-486, or mifepristone.  When the FDA approved 
mifepristone for use in inducing abortions, the approved drug label 
described a particular regimen (the on-label regimen).  Yet, as is of-
ten the case, off-label use of the drug quickly emerged.85  Legislative 
 
sician who performs abortions in Texas, the law affects every woman in Texas seeking an 
abortion.  Id. at 414. 
 82 Id. at 415 (citing the old age of physicians performing abortions and other reasons why 
recruiting efforts were unsuccessful). 
 83 753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 870 (2014). 
 84 Id. at 907, 909 (citing H.B. 2036, codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-449.03(E)(6), and the 
implementing regulation, Ariz. Admin. Code § R9-10-1508(G)). 
 85 See id. at 909 (explaining that once approved for marketing, the FDA does not prohibit or 
discourage off-label uses of drugs and further, because adding uses to an approved label 
requires action by a drug manufacturer, valid uses supported by evidence sometimes nev-
er make it onto the label).  This is what happened in the case of mifepristone:  an off-
label regimen was developed and it has never been added to the drug’s label.  Both regi-
mens involve two medications:  mifepristone, which kills the embryo/fetus, and 
misoprosol, which causes the uterine to contract and expel the embryo/fetus.  Planned 
Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, 13 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1020 (D. Ariz. 2014).  The on-
label regimen involves taking 600 milligrams of mifepristone orally at a health facility, re-
turning two days later to take 400 micrograms of misoprosol orally, and returning for a 
follow-up visit.  Clinical evidence submitted to the FDA to obtain approval for marketing 
showed this on-label regimen to be safe and effective for inducing abortion through sev-
en weeks of pregnancy, or forty-nine days from the woman’s last menstrual period 
(“LMP”).  Humble, 753 F.3d. at 907.  The off-label regimen involves taking 200 milligrams 
of mifepristone orally at a clinic, taking 800 micrograms of misoprostol two days later at 
home, and returning to the clinic for a follow-up visit.  Id. at 907–08.  Studies (of some 
sort) have shown the off-label regimen to be safe and effective through nine weeks of 
pregnancy, or sixty-three days LMP.  Id. at 907.  The off-label regime involves a lower dos-
age of mifepristone, but doubles the dosage of misoprosal—the drug causing the contrac-
tions and expulsions.  The more intense and prolonged contractions resulting from the 
increased dosage of misoprosal is the reason the off-label regimen is effective through six-
ty-three days LMP.  The more effective expulsion also is the reason its proponents can say 
that the off-label regimen has reduced risk factors:  namely, the incidence of on-going 
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findings accompanying the law explained its purpose as protecting 
women from “dangerous and potentially deadly off-label use of abor-
tion-inducing drugs, such as, for example, mifepristone,” and as en-
suring that physicians abide by protocol tested and approved by the 
FDA “as outlined in the drug labels.”86 
Using the standard approach to the Casey analysis, the district 
court in Humble had denied a preliminary injunction, finding that the 
law passed rational basis scrutiny and did not impose an undue bur-
den on the right to decide to terminate a pregnancy.  The district 
court acknowledged that the challengers presented evidence suggest-
ing that medication abortions generally are as safe or safer than sur-
gical abortions; that many practicing physicians consider the off-label 
regimen to reflect best practices; that the risk of ongoing pregnancies 
and the need for surgical intervention are reduced due to a higher 
dosage of a drug causing contractions; and that the off-label regimen 
may be used through sixty-three days from the last menstrual period 
(“LMP”), rather than through day forty-seven LPM.87  Yet, following a 
traditional approach to rational basis review, the court explained that 
this evidence did not mean there was no rational basis for the law:  
“The State need not legislate the best means by which to achieve a 
goal.  There is no least restrictive means component to rational basis 
review; rational speculation will suffice.  An imperfect fit can be ra-
tional, and it is not for the [c]ourt to ‘improve’ or ‘cleanse’ the legis-
lative process.”88  The legislature had sought to protect women from 
dangerous off-label uses and the court specifically pointed to Legisla-
tive Finding #13, which reflected concern about increased risk of 
complications due to failure to complete the two-step medication 
dosage.89  Requiring the on-label regimen (which involves taking the 
second step at the health facility) is one way to address this concern.  
The court stated:  “Where reasonable minds can disagree, there is a 
rational basis.”90 
Regarding the burdens caused by the law, the court acknowledged 
that requiring the on-label regimen would increase the cost of obtain-
ing a medication abortion (costs stemming from the higher dosage of 
 
pregnancies is reduced from 1% to 0.5%, and the need for surgical intervention to fully 
clear the uterus is reduced from 8% to less than 2%.  Id. at 908. 
 86 Id. at 910; Humble, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 1020. 
 87 Humble, 13 F. Supp. 3d, at 1022–23; see supra note 85 for a description of the two regi-
mens. 
 88 Id. at 1023 (citing Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 593–94). 
 89 Id. at 1022. 
 90 Id. at 1023 (citing Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315). 
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mifepristone and from an additional clinic visit), but noted that such 
burdens generally have been found to fall short of creating a substan-
tial obstacle.91  The court concluded that, “[i]n a large fraction of 
[the] cases, the law [simply operated to] change the method” availa-
ble.92  For women seeking medication abortion through day forty-
nine LMP, the law precluded access to the off-label regimen, but left 
open the on-label regimen and the option of a surgical abortion.93  As 
to women denied access to medication abortion between days forty-
nine and sixty-three LMP, the option of surgical abortion remained.  
In light of Casey and Gonzales, the ready availability of a safe alterna-
tive method of abortion undermined the challengers’ argument.94  As 
to the argument that the law imposed a substantial obstacle for wom-
en seeking abortions between days forty-nine and sixty-three LMP 
who for some medical reason could not safely have a surgical abor-
tion, the court explained that the challengers did not produce suffi-
cient evidence or explanation to meet its burden on the issue of sub-
stantial obstacle, but also noted that a proper approach to the claim 
would be an “as-applied challenge” to the law.95  The district court 
opinion thus closely paralleled the majority opinion in Gonzales. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, faulting the district court for not fol-
lowing a refinement to the Casey analysis purportedly established in 
an earlier Ninth Circuit case—a refinement involving the Balancing 
Approach.96 The Ninth Circuit explained that, given the refinement, 
[W]e compare the extent of the burden a law imposes on a woman’s 
right to abortion with the strength of the state’s justification for the law.  
The more substantial the burden, the stronger the state’s justification for 
the law must be to satisfy the undue burden test; conversely, the stronger 
the state’s justification, the greater the burden may be before it becomes 
“undue.” . . . In [hard cases], we must weigh the burdens against the 
state’s justification, asking whether and to what extent the challenged 
regulation actually advances the state’s interests.  If a burden significantly 
exceeds what is necessary to advance the state’s interests, it is “undue.”97 
 
 91 Id. at 1025 (citing and following Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v. DeWine, 
696 F.3d 490, 514 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding a similar state law)). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 1020. 
 94 Id. at 1026. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Humble, 753 F.3d at 914. 
 97 Id. at 912–13 (citing Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 542 (9th Cir. 2004) 
and WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2492 (1993) (noting that “undue” is de-
fined as “excessive” or “unwarranted”)). 
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Use of the Balancing Approach altered the analysis substantially.  The 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, and ordered the court to is-
sue the preliminary injunction requested by Planned Parenthood.98 
Although the Ninth Circuit assumed the law would pass rational 
basis review, the court nonetheless discounted Arizona’s legislative 
findings, which the district court had said plainly reflected a legiti-
mate purpose.  The district court had required no trial evidence 
where the legislative purpose is plain and the law passes rational basis 
review, but the Ninth Circuit held that without evidence in the record 
demonstrating that the law advances women’s health the law appears 
“wholly ‘unnecessary as a matter of [women’s] health.’”99  This find-
ing clearly impacted the burden analysis.  The Ninth Circuit found 
that the law created a substantial obstacle because it would increase 
costs, which evidence suggested would prevent some poor women 
from obtaining abortions; would perhaps lead to one Planned 
Parenthood clinic closing, which would lead to greater travel burdens 
for some women, which in-turn might delay some abortions; and 
would effectively ban medication abortions for some women, e.g., 
those who do not discover a pregnancy within forty-nine days LMP.100  
Whereas the district court had found that, in light of Casey and Gonza-
les, these burdens were not substantial—especially in light of the 
ready availability of a safe alternative method, e.g., surgical abortion, 
use of the Balancing Approach changed the calculus such that bur-
dens clearly less substantial sufficed.  The Ninth Circuit distinguished 
Gonzales and, despite the ready availability of a safe alternative means 
to abort, the Ninth Circuit held that the burden created a substantial 
obstacle.101 
 
 98 Id. at 917–18 (concluding that the challengers had shown a likelihood of success on their 
claim that the law imposes an undue burden, and noting that Arizona had not argued 
that plaintiffs failed to show “a likelihood of irreparable harm or that the balance of 
hardships and public interest do not favor a preliminary injunction,” and thus had waived 
such an argument). 
 99 Id. at 914–15 (assuming, without deciding, that the law passed rational basis review, and 
quoting Eden, 379 F.3d at 542 (alteration in original)).  The Ninth Circuit also highlight-
ed a district court statement that the off-label regime has a “clear advantage” in that it al-
lows medication abortion through the ninth week of pregnancy, rather than the seventh 
week, an “advantage” from the perspective of allowing women to choose medication 
abortion over surgical abortion for a longer period of time.  Id. 
100 Id. at 915–16.  The court explained that Eden recognized numerous types of burdens:  
“significant increase in the cost”; impact on supply of providers and clinics; delay caused 
by the law and the idea that “delay increases health risks”; “a law’s stigmatizing of abor-
tion practice”; legislative “usurping of providers’ ability to exercise medical judgment”; 
and the way that the law “interacts with women’s lived experience, socioeconomic factors, 
and other abortion regulations.”  Id. at 915. 
101 Id. at 917.  The court explained:  
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The Balancing Approach thus significantly modifies the Casey 
analysis.  In these cases, the challenges would have been unsuccessful 
“but for” a weighing of the extent to which the challenged laws fur-
thered state interests and a diminution of the concept of substantial 
obstacle.  Without the Balancing Approach, the courts could not have 
legitimately concluded that the effect of the laws on access to abor-
tion rose to the level of an undue burden. 
3.  The Fifth Circuit’s Rejection of the Balancing Approach 
The Fifth Circuit in decisions after Abbott I has continued to ex-
plicitly reject use of the Balancing Approach.  In Abbott II, the Fifth 
Circuit’s review of the case on the merits, the court more clearly re-
jected use of the Balancing Approach.102  Planned Parenthood had 
expressly urged the court to adopt a “stricter standard” because the 
state interest in play was that of protecting the mother’s health rather 
than fetal life.103  The court did not do so, noting that Supreme Court 
precedent does not support such a “bifurcation.”104  The court also 
emphasized the illogical nature of the proposal.  By way of example, 
the court explained that it makes no sense to try to treat laws protect-
ing the life of the unborn child differently from laws making abortion 
safer—because both types of laws serve to protect children:  “every 
limit on abortion that furthers a mother’s health also protects any ex-
isting children and her future ability to bear children even if it facili-
tates a particular abortion.”105  To the Fifth Circuit, then, the appro-
priate analysis, even as to an abortion regulation aimed primarily at 
 
  [I]n Gonzales, the challenged law left in place “a commonly used and generally 
accepted method” that was very similar to the one it banned.  Therefore, the 
burden in Gonzales was slight, while the government’s interest in fetal life was suf-
ficient to justify the burden.  Here, the Arizona law imposes a greater burden 
and is not justified by any interest. . . . [F]or women between 49 and 63 days 
LMP, the Arizona law prohibits medication abortion entirely, leaving surgical 
abortion as the only legal alternative.  In contrast to [the two surgical procedures 
at issue in Gonzales], medication abortion and surgical abortion are very dissimi-
lar procedures.   
  Id.  Gonzales involved the federal ban on Partial Birth Abortion, which banned use of a 
procedure involving delivery and killing of an intact fetus, but left in place procedures in-
volving intentional dismemberment and removal of fetus parts.  Id. 
102 Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 590. 
103 Id. (noting that Planned Parenthood, for support, cited Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 
U.S. at 431, a case the Ninth Circuit noted had been superceded by Casey). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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patient safety or regulation of the medical profession, focuses on the 
two standard inquiries in the Casey analysis.106 
The application of the two-step analysis in Abbott II tracks Abbott I 
closely, especially as to the conclusion that the Texas admitting privi-
leges law did not present a substantial obstacle to women’s access to 
abortion services.107  However, the court in Abbott II more strongly 
emphasized the traditional approach to assessing the basis for the 
law, and the reason for the approach.  The approach is very deferen-
tial, and a court’s job is simply to determine whether any conceivable 
rationale exists.  The court explained: 
Because the determination does not lend itself to an evidentiary inquiry 
in court, the state is not required to “prove” that the objective of the law 
would be fulfilled.  Most legislation deals ultimately in probabilities, the 
estimation of the people’s representatives that a law will be beneficial to 
the community.  Success often cannot be “proven” in advance.  The court 
may not replace legislative predictions or calculations of probabilities 
with its own [without usurping] the legislative power. . . .  The fact that 
reasonable minds can disagree on legislation, moreover, suffices to prove 
that the law has a rational basis. . . .  [T]here is no least restrictive means 
component to rational basis review.108 
The Fifth Circuit also explained why this approach is particularly ap-
propriate in the realm of constitutional adjudication: 
If legislators’ predictions about a law fail to serve their purpose, the law 
can be changed.  Once the courts have held a law unconstitutional, how-
ever, only a constitutional amendment, or the wisdom of a majority of 
justices overcoming the strong pull of stare decisis will permit that or simi-
lar laws to again take effect.109 
The district court clearly had not used this approach.  The Fifth Cir-
cuit acknowledged the evidence presented by Planned Parenthood, 
which tended to show that women experiencing complications from 
 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 590, 595. The Fifth Circuit held the district court findings about clinic closings 
vague and unsupported, but also noted that even if “both clinics in the Rio Grande Val-
ley” were to close, the evidence did not show that any woman would lack reasonable ac-
cess to a clinic in Texas.  Id. at 597–98.  Travel between the four counties in the Rio 
Grande Valley and Corpus Christi (where abortion services remain available) involves at 
most 150 miles and takes less than three hours on Texas highways.  Id. at 597.  Further, 
90% of women seeking abortion in Texas would be able to access abortion services within 
100 miles of their residence.  Id. at 598.  The court concluded that any “burden does not 
fall on the vast majority of Texas women seeking abortions,” and thus the regulation 
would “not affect a significant (much less ‘large’) fraction of such women, and it imposes 
on other women in Texas less of a burden than the waiting-period provision upheld in 
Casey.”  Id. at 600.  The court also pointed to the lack of evidence showing that abortion 
providers would be unable to comply with the admitting privileges law.  Id. at 598–99. 
108 Id. at 594 (internal citations omitted). 
109 Id. 
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abortions generally can be treated successfully at emergency rooms.110  
But the state had presented evidence showing that the law had the 
potential to improve patient care:  evidence that most serious medical 
errors involve miscommunication that occurs when patients are 
handed from one caregiver to another; that an abortion provider 
with admitting privileges would be in a better position to know which 
specialists at the hospital could best help a woman with complica-
tions; and that most emergency rooms nationwide lack adequate on-
call coverage by specialists such as Ob/Gyns, which very often is the 
type of specialist a woman with complications would need.111  Under a 
traditional rational basis inquiry, then, the state’s evidence clearly suf-
ficed.112 
The Fifth Circuit bolstered its conclusion by pointing to decisions 
from the Fourth and Eighth Circuits which had upheld similar admit-
ting privileges laws,113 and expressly discounted the Seventh Circuit’s 
Van Hollen decision.114  The Seventh Circuit had faulted the state for 
not producing statistical evidence that the admitting-privileges law 
would promote patient safety, and the Fifth Circuit objected, noting 
that the first-step in the Casey analysis of an abortion regulation “is ra-
tional basis review, not empirical basis review.”115 
Within months another lawsuit was filed, raising as-applied chal-
lenges to the Texas admitting privileges law (as applied to the 
McAllen and El Paso clinics), and facial and as-applied challenges to 
another Texas abortion regulation, namely, rules directing that min-
imum standards for abortion facilities must be equivalent to mini-
mum standards for ambulatory surgery centers (“ASC”).116  In Whole 
 
110 Id. at 591. 
111 Id. at 592–93, 595. 
112 Id. at 594–95. The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court wrongly analyzed wheth-
er the law was unconstitutional due to a “purpose” of presenting a substantial obstacle.  
The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with parties challenging an abortion 
regulation, and that the district court had gotten it “plainly backwards.”  Id. at 597. 
113 Id. at 595 (citing Greenville Women’s Clinic, 317 F.3d at 363; Webster, 871 F.2d at 1381). 
114 Id. at 596.  In part this was because Van Hollen involved facts that more readily warranted 
granting a preliminary injunction regardless of the decision on the merits, e.g., the ad-
mitting privileges law at issue had been enacted on a Friday and became effective on the 
following Monday—meaning that access to abortion services certainly would be disrupted 
at least in the short-term.  But the Fifth Circuit also disagreed with the approach used by 
the court in Van Hollen.  Id. 
115 Id. (noting that the court in Van Hollen had “ignored case law from its own circuit hold-
ing, consistent with the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated guidance, that there is ‘never a role 
for evidentiary proceedings’ under rational basis review”). 
116 Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 676–78 (noting that the ambulatory-surgical center requirements 
are codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 245.010(a) & 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 
139.40).  All plaintiffs in the case challenged the ambulatory-surgical-center (ASC) provi-
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Woman’s Health v. Lakey, the district court enjoined the laws, finding 
that the ASC provision places an undue burden on women through-
out Texas; that the ASC and the admitting privileges law, as-applied 
to the McAllen and El Paso clinics, place an undue burden on women 
in the Rio Grande Valley; and that the provisions together place an 
undue burden on women throughout Texas117 (a finding resulting in 
an order in direct contradiction to Abbott II’s rejection of a facial chal-
lenge to the admitting privileges law).118 
In reaching these conclusions, the district court defiantly depart-
ed from Fifth Circuit precedent.  The district court acknowledged 
that, in light of Abbott II’s clarification, both the ASC and admitting 
privileges requirements “surmount[ed] the low bar of rational-basis 
review.”119  As such, the court’s conclusions would flow from the sub-
stantial obstacle analysis.  In concluding that both laws presented a 
substantial obstacle, the court focused on clinic closures and the fact 
that the ASC requirements would make it difficult for new abortion 
facilities to open.120  The court found that “a signification number of 
the reproductive-age female population of Texas [would] need to 
travel considerably further in order to exercise its right to a legal 
previability abortion,” and discounted the state’s claim that facilities 
remaining open could handle the demand.121  To bolster its finding 
that increased travel distances rose to the level of a substantial obsta-
cle, the court pointed to a host of other practical difficulties that 
might also be experienced by women:  “lack of availability of child 
care, unreliability of transportation,” inability to get “time off from 
work, immigration status and inability to pass border checkpoints, 
poverty,” the time and expenses associated with increased distances, 
and “other, inarticulable psychological obstacles.”122  According to the 
court, “[t]hese factors combine with increased travel distances to es-
tablish a de facto barrier to obtaining an abortion for a large number 
of Texas women of reproductive age who might choose to seek a legal 
 
sion on its face and as applied to medication abortions, and the admitting privileges re-
quirement ASC provision was challenged as-applied to the McAllen and El Paso Clinics.  
Id. at 678. 
117 Id. at 687. 
118 Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 293 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated in part, 135 S. 
Ct. 399 (2014). 
119 Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 680.  Although the court expressly limited the finding to the as-
applied challenges of the El Paso and Rio Grande Valley clinics, id., the finding logically 
would apply to all challenges in the lawsuit. 
120 Id. at 682, 684. 
121 Id. at 681–82. 
122 Id. at 682–83. 
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abortion.”123  Yet, in reality, the court pointed only to factors relating 
to practical difficulties and expenses; effects that, under Casey’s 
benchmarks, do not present a substantial obstacle.124 
To bolster its conclusion, the district court again introduced the 
balancing inquiry into the analysis.  The court assessed the empirical 
basis for the state’s argument that the laws furthered the state’s inter-
ests in the health and safety of women seeking abortions in Texas.125  
Regarding the admitting privileges law, the court found that—despite 
the potential for increased safety recognized by the Fifth Circuit in 
Abbott II—the law nonetheless fell short “compared to the burden the 
requirement imposes on women [in the Rio Grande and El Paso] ar-
eas.”126  The court characterized the credentialing rational as “weak 
and speculative,”127 and thus concluded: 
After thorough consideration of the severity of the burdens presented by 
the act’s two requirements, the court concludes that the requirements, 
independently and when viewed as they operate together, have the ulti-
mate effect of erecting a substantial obstacle for women in Texas who 
seek to obtain a previability abortion. . . .  Finally, the court [also] con-
cludes that the ambulatory-surgical-center requirement imposes an un-
due burden specifically as applied to the provision of medication abor-
tions, where any medical justification for the requirement is at its 
absolute weakest in comparison with the heavy burden it imposes.128 
 
123 Id. at 683 (emphasis in original).  To counter the state’s argument that the Fifth Circuit 
in Abbott I and II recognized a de facto safe harbor of 150 miles, the court stated:  “It is 
overly simplistic and reductionist to conclude that absolute distances or theoretical travel 
times measured under ideal circumstances act identically on a population as diverse as 
Texas’s.  They simply do not.”  Id. at 682–83. 
124 Id. The court also did not frame its conclusion in the terms the Fifth Circuit used in Abbott 
II:  there is no assessment of whether “the burden,” although impacting significant num-
bers of women, “fall[s] on the vast majority of Texas women seeking abortions.”  Abbott II, 
748 F.3d at 600. 
125 Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684.  The court credited the plaintiffs’ evidence that abortion in 
Texas before enactment of the laws was relatively safe in terms of “low rates of serious 
complications” or deaths, safer than “many common medical procedures not subject to 
such intense regulation and scrutiny,” and that risks are not lower for patients undergo-
ing abortions at ambulatory surgical centers.  Id.  Regarding the ASC requirements, the 
court also noted that many of the facility standards have only a “tangential relationship to 
patient safety in the context of abortion;” and that, because the effect of the laws includ-
ed a potential for delay in access abortion services, any potential for increased safety was 
offset by risks associated with delay.  Id. 
126 Id. at 685 (concluding that “the heavy burden imposed on the women of West Texas, El 
Paso, and the Rio Grande Valley by the admitting privileges requirement is not appropri-
ately balanced by a credible medical or health rationale”). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 685–86. 
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The resulting order effectively enjoined enforcement state-wide of 
both the admitting privileges and ASC requirements.129 
The state again sought stay of the injunctions pending appeal and 
the Fifth Circuit in Lakey held that the state had made a strong show-
ing of likelihood of success on the merits as to all but one claim.130  In 
the decision on the merits, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, the Fifth Cir-
cuit opinion largely parallels the decision in Lakey.131  In both deci-
sions the court expressly rejected the Balancing Approach. 
The court first noted that “facial invalidation of the admitting 
privileges [law] was directly contrary” to Abbott II and thus clearly 
wrong.132  As to the ASC requirements, because the trial court had 
acknowledged that the provision surmounted rational basis review, 
the Fifth Circuit focused only on the second prong of the Casey analy-
sis; and, further, focused primarily on whether the requirements had 
the “effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion.”133 
The Fifth Circuit highlighted several errors in the district court’s 
analysis:  e.g., the court further diluted the facial challenge standard, 
as a matter of both the legal standard134 and the assessment of the ev-
 
129 Id. at 687–88; see also Lakey, 769 F.3d at 289–92, vacated in part, 135 S.Ct. 399 (2014) (high-
lighting uncertainty regarding the district court’s order, and electing to address a stay as 
to injunctions of both laws “on their face” and as applied to the McAllen and El Paso clin-
ics, and of the ASC requirement as applied to medication abortions). 
130 Lakey, 769 F.3d at 301. 
131 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), mandate stayed, 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015).  In Cole, the court 
vacated the district court’s enjoinment of enforcement of:  (i) the admitting privileges 
requirement and the ACS requirement “as applied to ‘all women seeking a previability 
abortion,’” id. at 567; (ii) the ASC requirement as applied to medication abortions, id. at 
591; and (iii) the admitting privileges and ACS requirement as-applied to the El Paso 
abortion facility, id. at 567.  The court allowed enforcement, but narrowed the district 
court’s order, as to the admitting privileges and the ACS requirements as-applied to the 
McAllen facility. Id.  at 594–96. 
132 Cole, 790 F.3d at 581; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 293. 
133 Cole, 790 F.3d at 584; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 294. The district court had found that the ASC 
requirement was unconstitutional under the purpose inquiry, and the Fifth Circuit re-
jected this view:  “the Texas Legislature’s stated purpose was to improve patient safety;” 
courts may not “second guess a legislature’s stated purposes absent clear and compelling 
evidence to the contrary”; and the district court cited no such evidence and reached a 
conclusion about disparate treatment based on an erroneous interpretation of the regu-
latory scheme.  Cole, 790 F.3d at 584–86; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 294–95. 
134 Lakey, 769 F.3d at 296.  Applying “neither the Fifth Circuit’s ‘no set of circumstances’ test 
nor Casey’s ‘large fraction’ test,” the district court instead rested its conclusion on its find-
ing that “‘a significant number of the reproductive-age female population of Texas [would] 
need to travel considerably further in order to exercise its right to a legal previability 
abortion.’”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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idence;135 the court improperly relied on a multitude of “practical 
concerns” associated with increased travel, when a proper analysis 
must be on obstacles imposed by the law itself;136 and the court’s find-
ing regarding the inability of remaining clinics to serve women seek-
ing abortion was not supported by evidence in the record.137  While 
the record evidence did suggest that the overall cost of accessing an 
abortion provider likely would increase, the Fifth Circuit reiterated 
Supreme Court precedent noting that a law that serves a valid pur-
pose is not facially invalid due to an “incidental effect of making it 
more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion.”138 
 
135 Id. at 298.  To the appellate court, evidence presented during the trial was not sufficient 
to show that a “large fraction” of women seeking abortion would face a substantial obsta-
cle due to the ASC requirements.  The Fifth Circuit explained that the numbers present-
ed by plaintiffs’ expert suggested that, after the clinic closures, only 16.7% of women 
seeking an abortion would live more than 150 miles from the nearest clinic, and that as-
suming 150 miles is the relevant cut-off, this surely would not suffice for facial invalida-
tion of an abortion regulation.  The court held, “The general standard for facial chal-
lenges allows courts to facially invalidate a statute only if ‘no possible application of the 
challenged law would be constitutional.’  In other words, the law must be unconstitution-
al in 100% of its applications.  We decline to interpret Casey as changing the threshold for 
facial challenges from 100% to 17%.” Cole, 790 F.3d at 588;   Lakey, 769 F.3d at 298 (in-
ternal citations omitted).  The Fifth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
would have narrowed the appropriate denominator in the “large fraction analysis” to only 
“women ‘who could have accessed abortion services in Texas prior to the implementation 
of the challenged requirements, but who will face increased obstacles as a result of the 
law.’”  Id.  at 299.  The Fifth Circuit explained that this approach makes the test “merely a 
tautology.” Cole, 790 F.3d at 589; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 299.  That is, to narrow the denomina-
tor to only those women who plaintiffs argue will face an undue burden would always re-
sult in a large fraction:  “The demoninator would be women that Plaintiffs claim are un-
duly burdened by the statute, and the numerator would be the same.”  Cole, 790 F.3d at 
589; Lakey, 769 F.3d at 299. 
136 Cole, 790 F.3d at 589 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)); Lakey, 769 F.3d 
at 299; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (“The indigency that may make it diffi-
cult—and in some cases, perhaps, impossible—for some women to have abortions is nei-
ther created nor in any way affected by the [state’s] regulation.”). 
137 Lakey, 769 F.3d at 299–300 & n.17 (noting that “there [was] no evidence in the record 
that women have faced delays, have been turned away for lack of capacity, or will face de-
lays in the future”); see also Cole, 790 F.3d at 590. 
138 Lakey, 769 F.3d at 300.  The Fifth Circuit in Cole also disagreed with the district court’s 
conclusion as to the burden resulting from the admitting privileges and ASC require-
ments as-applied to the El Paso facility.  The court noted that an effect of the laws was the 
closure of the facility, and that women in El Paso would face an increased travel distance 
greater than 500 miles if they choose to use a clinic in Texas.  Cole, 790 F.3d at 596, 598.  
However, a clinic existed within the same metropolitan area as El Paso—across the state 
line in Santa Teresa, New Mexico.  Id. at 597–98.  Although the court in Lakey decided it 
was constrained from considering the Santa Teresa clinic due to a recent Fifth Circuit 
opinion holding that the focus must remain on clinics within Texas, the court in Cole dis-
tinguished the case.  790 F.3d at 597 (noting that Texas still had some abortion providers 
within the state) (citing Lakey, 769 F.3d at 304 (citing Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. 
Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457–58 (5th Cir. 2014)). 
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In rejecting the Balancing Approach, the Fifth Circuit again 
acknowledged that other circuits have used the approach, but reiter-
ated Abbott II’s emphasis on the inappropriateness “of second-
guessing the wisdom of the legislature in a constitutional chal-
lenge.”139  The Fifth Circuit in Lakey also supplemented the reasoning 
provided in Abbott II, explaining that, in essence, “the district court’s 
approach ratchets up rational basis review into a pseudo-strict-
scrutiny approach . . . [and] we have no authority by which to turn 
rational basis into strict scrutiny under the guise of the undue burden 
inquiry.”140 
Although this characterization is not as accurate or helpful as it 
could be, it makes a valid point.  The district court did not purport to 
conduct the first step of the Casey analysis, and thus the district 
court’s use of the Balancing Approach did not ratchet up the inquiry 
into the legislative basis for the laws.  Nonetheless, the Balancing Ap-
proach radically changes the Casey analysis and does so by introduc-
ing aspects of strict scrutiny analysis:  lower courts clearly are ratchet-
ing up the relational inquiry by requiring empirical evidence showing 
a substantial relationship to important state interests, and are critical 
if the laws are not narrowly tailored. 
In the Abbott and Lakey litigation, the Fifth Circuit advanced three 
main reasons for rejecting incorporation of a balancing approach in-
to the Casey analysis:  (1) there is no reason to assess the constitution-
ality of abortion laws serving a state interest in women’s health and 
 
139 Lakey, 769 F.3d at 297 (“The district court’s weighing of the interests basically boils down 
to the district court’s own view that the facilities are already safe for women and that the 
[ASC] provision, when implemented, will not serve to promote women’s health.”).  The 
court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, Barnes v. Mis-
sissippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1339 (5th Cir. 1993), supported use of the balancing approach.  
Id. at 297–98.  See also Cole, 790 F.3d at 587 (quoting Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 594; Gonzales, 
550 U.S. at 163, 164, 166) (emphasizing that medical judgments are generally decided by 
the legislature). 
140 Lakey, 769 F.3d at 297, n.11 (citing Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 594) (noting that “[t]his is par-
ticularly problematic in a facial challenge to a newly enacted law,” given that “most legis-
lation deals ultimately in probabilities, the estimation of the people’s representatives that 
a law will be beneficial to the community”—and thus that “[s]uccess often cannot be 
‘proven’ in advance”); see also Cole, 790 F.3d at 587 (quoting Lakey, 769 F.3d at 297). 
   A dissenting opinion in Lakey did not view Abbott II as precluding the district court’s 
approach.  The dissent construed Abbott II as rejecting empirical assessment as part of the 
rational basis analysis (step-one of the Casey analysis), but as leaving the door open to an 
assessment of the weight of the state’s interest as part of the “undue burden” prong.  769 
F.3d at 307 (Higginson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The dissenting 
opinion’s primary rationale for affirming use of the balancing analysis, however, was to 
avoid a split in circuit authority; but the opinion also cites—as have other courts—the 
statement in Casey that “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of 
presenting a substantial obstacle . . . impose an undue burden.” Id. at 307. 
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safety differently from laws serving a state interest in the life of the 
unborn child; (2) the relational inquiry in the Casey analysis does not 
require supporting empirical evidence and should be deferential to 
state legislatures, particularly in the context of constitutional chal-
lenges to the laws; and (3) the Balancing Approach is an unwarrant-
ed back-door entry to strict scrutiny analysis of abortion regulation, 
and results in significant dilution of the substantial obstacle test. 
III.  ASSESSMENT OF THEORIES 
As noted, Judge Posner in Van Hollen provided no analysis or ex-
planation and cited to no authority for modifying the Casey analysis.141  
Rather, without question or explanation he simply adopted a view of 
the law as articulated and applied by the district court.142  The district 
court had provided at least some explanation.143  Additionally, courts 
in two decisions issued in 2014 have provided thoughtful theories in 
support of the Balancing Approach:  the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble,144 and the District 
Court for the Middle District of Alabama in Planned Parenthood South-
east, Inc. v. Strange.145  The explanations are but the flip side of the 
reasons identified by the Fifth Circuit for declining to modify the Ca-
sey analysis.  The theories turn on a perceived need to treat laws ad-
vancing women’s health and safety differently from laws advancing 
respect for unborn human life; on a reading of Casey and Gonzales 
that requires courts to balance or reconcile legitimate state interests 
and a women’s interest in access to abortion as part and parcel of Ca-
sey’s undue burden analysis; and on a reading of Gonzales that re-
quires states to produce evidence of both the need for the law to pro-
tect women’s health and the extent to which the law actually will 
 
141 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text; see also Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798.  After 
noting that the Casey analysis involves two distinct steps, Judge Posner cited important 
Supreme Court cases (Casey, Carhart, and Mazurek).  Id.  However, he did not attempt to 
tie his modification of the undue burden analysis to those cases.  Id. at 798–99. 
142 Id.  The district court’s conclusion regarding the second prong of the Casey analysis clear-
ly hinged on the balancing approach:  “Even if there were some evidence that the admit-
ting privileges requirement would actually further women’s health, any benefit is greatly 
outweighed by the burdens caused  . . . .” Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *13, 19. 
143 Id. at *9. 
144 753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014). 
145 See Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1332–33 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (deciding, after a ten-day trial, 
that the challenged state law created a substantial obstacle for women seeking abortions) 
order amended, No. 2:13cv405–MHT, 2014 WL 5426891 (M.D. Ala. Oct 24, 2014,), and sup-
plemented, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1381 (M.D. Ala. 2014)); Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1275, 1299 (re-
solving parties’ motions for summary judgment, and deciding a trial was warranted on 
Planned Parenthood’s undue burden claim).   
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succeed.  This part of the Article describes and assesses the merits of 
the theories which, in the end, hinge on proper interpretation of Ca-
sey and Gonzales. 
A.  Reading Casey as Requiring the Balancing Approach 
1.  A Purported Directive to Analyze Health Laws Differently 
The need to treat health laws differently as a reason for modifying 
the Casey analysis was most clearly articulated and relied on by the 
Ninth Circuit in the Humble decision.  As noted, the court in Humble 
faulted the district court for not following an earlier case purportedly 
refining the Casey analysis, namely, Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden.146  
The court in Humble read Eden as requiring the Balancing Approach 
because of the nature of the law being challenged.  The law at issue 
in Humble (requiring medication induced abortions to be adminis-
tered in compliance with the on-label regimen) was enacted to ad-
vance state interests related to women’s health.  In Eden, the Ninth 
Circuit had suggested that the undue burden analysis might not apply 
in the same way to a challenge involving women’s health laws.  Specif-
ically, the Ninth Circuit in Eden had made the following statement. 
[Casey’s] application of the “undue burden” standard is often not ex-
tendable in obvious ways to the context of a law purporting to promote 
maternal health. 
In the context of a law purporting to promote fetal life, whatever obsta-
cles that law places in the way of women seeking abortions logically serve 
the interest the law purports to promote—fetal life—because they will 
prevent some women from obtaining abortions.  By contrast, in the con-
text of a law purporting to promote maternal health, a law that is poorly 
drafted or which is a pretext for anti-abortion regulation can both place 
obstacles in the way of women seeking abortions and fail to serve the 
purported interest very closely, or at all.147 
The court in Humble interpreted Eden as thereby establishing a modi-
fied way of applying the substantial obstacle analysis, wherein “the ex-
tent of the burden a law imposes on a woman’s right to abortion [is 
compared] with the strength of the state’s justification for the law 
[and] [t]he more substantial the burden, the stronger the state’s jus-
tification for the law must be to satisfy the undue burden test; [and] 
conversely, the stronger the state’s justification, the greater the bur-
 
146 Humble, 753 F.3d at 912–14 (discussing Eden, 379 F.3d at 539–40, 542); see supra notes 96–
97 and accompanying text. 
147 Id. at 912 (quoting Eden, 379 F.3d at 539–40 (citations omitted)). 
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den may be before it becomes ‘undue.’”148  The Ninth Circuit in 
Humble expressly claimed that the court in Eden “described” this ap-
proach to applying the substantial obstacle analysis.149 
This basis for the Balancing Approach is untenable.  The Ninth 
Circuit in Eden did not describe the undue burden analysis in the way 
claimed by the court in Humble, and clearly did not apply it in that 
way.  Rather, the court in Eden simply highlighted the importance of 
ensuring that a law purporting to protect the state’s interest in wom-
en’s health does in fact further that interest.  In doing so, the court 
emphasized two aspects of the Casey analysis.  The court noted that 
the Casey plurality expressly indicated that the substantial obstacle 
analysis applies even as to health regulations.150  The court in Eden al-
so noted that, following Casey, rational basis review of a state law 
might in some cases eliminate the need for the substantial obstacle 
analysis:  “the undue burden standard is not triggered at all if a pur-
ported health regulation fails to rationally promote an interest in ma-
ternal health on its face, as would be the case where the state re-
quired physicians to provide false or misleading information to 
women seeking abortions.”151 
Because the challenged laws in Eden undeniably constituted a “typ-
ical set of health and safety regulations,” the Ninth Circuit focused on 
the second prong of the Casey analysis.152  However, nothing in the 
court’s discussion of the substantial obstacle analysis reflects applica-
 
148 Id. at 912–13 (“[In hard cases], we must weigh the burdens against the state’s justifica-
tion, asking whether and to what extent the challenged regulation actually advances the 
state’s interests.  If a burden significantly exceeds what is necessary to advance the state’s 
interests, it is ‘undue.’” (citing Eden, 379 F.3d at 542 and WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L 
DICTIONARY 2492 (1993) (noting that “undue” is defined as “excessive” or “unwarrant-
ed”))). 
149 Id. at 912. 
150 Eden, 379 F.3d at 539.  As to this point, the court quoted the following confusing state-
ment from Casey:  “As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to fur-
ther the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion.  Unnecessary health regulations 
that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an 
abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”  Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
151 Id. at 540 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 882) (noting, that“[i]f the information the State re-
quires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement 
may be permissible”).  The court also relied on Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997), 
to make this point.  The court in Eden explained that, in Mazurek, the Supreme Court ap-
plied the substantial obstacle analysis to a law “even in the face of evidence that it was ob-
jectively unnecessary.”  Eden, 379 F.3d at 540–41. 
152 Eden, 379 F.3d at 537, 541 (noting the laws required facilities performing five or more 
first trimester abortions in any month or any second or third trimester abortion to be li-
censed as health care institutions, and also imposed other requirements relating to ad-
ministration, personnel, staffing, the procedure itself, transfer and discharge, medical 
records, equipment, and physical facilities). 
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tion of the balancing attributed to Eden by the court in Humble.  Ra-
ther, the court in Eden reversed the lower court decision because the 
district court failed to make inferences regarding increased costs, 
failed to consider whether a significant increase in cost could, alone, 
present a substantial obstacle, and failed to consider other potential 
burdens allegedly caused by the regulations.153  Thus, although the 
court in Eden certainly used language that could be used to support 
modifying the Casey analysis,154 the Eden court did not articulate or 
apply a Balancing Approach. 
Perhaps recognizing its exaggeration of Eden, the Ninth Circuit al-
so expressly sought to connect the balancing to Casey.  Foremost, the 
court latched onto the statement in Casey that “[u]nnecessary health 
regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial 
obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden 
on the right.”155  The court in Humble elaborated on this statement by 
noting:  “Whether a regulation is necessary depends on whether and 
how well it serves the state’s interest.”156  The court also pulled anoth-
er sentence from Casey:  “[T]he means chosen by the State to further 
the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the wom-
an’s free choice, not hinder it.”157  The court extended this idea to 
laws enacted to protect women’s health:  according to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, “they ‘must be calculated’ to advance women’s health, ‘not hin-
der it.’”158 
This basis for the Balancing Approach also is unpersuasive.  Latch-
ing onto one sentence in Casey as a reason for treating health laws dif-
ferently is poor legal analysis.  Sound analysis depends not on pluck-
ing one sentence from a Supreme Court case, but on a full analysis of 
the relevant portions of the key governing decisions, namely, Casey 
and Gonzales. 
 
153 Id. at 541–43. 
154 In addition to the text the Humble court relied on, the court in Eden also noted:  “Indeed, 
in his concurring opinion in Casey, Justice Stevens indicated that a burden need not be 
onerous to be undue, if it is not supported by a legitimate state interest.”  Eden, 379 F.3d 
at 540 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 920–21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)).  The court in Humble did not rely on this statement in Eden, presumably recogniz-
ing that Justice Stevens’s view could not legitimately be taken as a good indication of the 
views reflected in the Casey plurality opinion. 
155 Humble, 753 F.3d at 913 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (emphasis omitted)). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877). 
158 Id.  The court’s citation to Casey for the extension to health laws is an overstatement.  At 
most the proper citation signal would have been “cf.” 
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Casey’s explanation of the undue burden analysis spans five and 
one-half pages.159  The sentence relied on by the Ninth Circuit is in 
one paragraph in Justice O’Connor’s “summary.”160  In the lengthy 
discussion preceding the summary, Justice O’Connor expressly makes 
clear that the undue burden analysis will apply to all laws bearing on 
abortion.  For example, in introducing the analysis Justice O’Connor 
notes that “[n]umerous forms of state regulation” might have the in-
cidental effect of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of 
abortion services, and “[t]he fact that a law which serves a valid pur-
pose . . . has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more 
expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate 
it.”161  More of the discussion speaks of the state’s interest in the un-
born human life within the woman, because Justice O’Connor was 
concerned in particular with remedying the undervaluation of that 
state interest in Roe and subsequent Supreme Court cases.162  But Jus-
tice O’Connor clearly intended the proposed analysis to apply to any 
state law bearing on the decision to abort.  She stated: 
[I]t is an overstatement to describe [the right at stake] as a right to de-
cide whether to have an abortion “without interference from the State.”  
All abortion regulations interfere to some degree with a woman’s ability to 
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. . . .  Not all governmental 
intrusion is of necessity unwarranted . . . .163 
Similarly, in a closing paragraph Justice O’Connor states that “[s]ome 
guiding principles should emerge” from the discussion.164  She first 
addresses laws that reflect the state’s “profound respect for the life of 
the unborn.”165  But she concludes with a reference to health laws:  
“Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an 
abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.”166  Giv-
ing dispositive weight to one sentence in a “summary” of the opinion 
thus reflects poor legal analysis.  Justice O’Connor’s overall discus-
sion simply does not create a distinction between laws based on the 
particular state interest at stake. 
 
159 Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–79. 
160 See id. at 878 (contrasting permissive health regulations to further health and safety of 
mother with unnecessary health regulations that impose an undue burden). 
161 Id. at 874. 
162 See, e.g., id. at 875–77 (clarifying the distinction between regulating abortions and denying 
women of the right to choose whether to terminate pregnancy). 
163 Id. at 875 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
164 Id. at 877. 
165 Id. at 877–78. 
166 Id. at 878. 
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Gonzales confirms this reading of Casey.  The ban in Gonzales served 
a variety of state interests:  protecting and preserving unborn human 
life; maintaining the integrity of the medical profession and society’s 
confidence in the medical community; fostering a woman’s interest 
in fully understanding the brutal nature of the banned abortion pro-
cedure; and avoiding a “coursening of society” associated with freely 
allowing a procedure akin to infanticide.167  Yet the analysis in Gonza-
les did not turn on the nature of the interest at stake.  Rather, the 
analysis focused on whether the ban furthered in some way those le-
gitimate state interests.168  To that extent, the Ninth Circuit’s state-
ment that health laws must be “calculated” to advance women’s 
health is not wholly off base.  But upon concluding that the ban did 
further the many interests at stake, the Court in Gonzales simply fo-
cused on the effect of the ban.169  As explained in greater depth in the 
next Part, the analysis in Gonzales did not involve any balancing or any 
assessment of “whether and how well” the law served the state inter-
ests.170  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s view of Casey as requiring a Bal-
ancing Approach for laws designed to foster women’s health is un-
dermined by careful reading of Casey and Gonzales.171 
2.  Balancing in Casey 
Rather than focusing on one sentence in Casey, the district court 
in Strange relied more heavily on the overall balancing that is reflect-
ed in Casey.  The court in Strange addressed the constitutionality of an 
Alabama admitting privileges law. 172  The law required every physi-
 
167 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–160 (discussing congressional intent). 
168 See id. (declaring explicitly that congressional goals were furthered). 
169 See id. (drawing inferences about potential changes in the practice of late term abor-
tions). 
170 See infra notes 187–237 and accompanying text. 
171 Further, even if it is true that, as stated by the Ninth Circuit in Eden, in the context of a 
law purporting to promote maternal health, “a law that is poorly drafted or which is a 
pretext for anti-abortion regulation can both place obstacles in the way of women seeking 
abortions and fail to serve the purported interest very closely, or at all,” 379 F.3d at 540, it 
is not clear why the balancing approach becomes the appropriate solution.  The decisions 
in Casey and Gonzales emphasize the need for abortion jurisprudence to accommodate 
laws furthering legitimate state interests.  The decisions make clear that such laws should 
be upheld unless they have the effect of presenting a substantial obstacle.  If concern ex-
ists about whether a state law is a “pretext” for antiabortion regulation, the decisions—
especially Gonzales—suggest that the task for courts is careful scrutiny as to the relational 
inquiry.  But the decisions do not support an empirical inquiry or an assessment of the 
extent to which the laws further the state interests. 
172 See Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1274–75 (denying summary judgment against substantive due 
process claim on similar admitting privileges law). 
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cian who performs either medication or surgical abortions to have 
staff privileges “at an acute care hospital within the same standard 
metropolitan statistical area as the facility is located” and that would 
permit the physician to perform procedures “reasonably necessary to 
treat abortion related complications.”173  As in the Van Hollen and 
Humble cases, adoption of the Balancing Approach proved determi-
native.  The court engaged in a lengthy analysis, and reached a con-
clusion similar to that in Van Hollen:  that the Alabama staff privileges 
law created a substantial obstacle because the state’s justifications 
were weak and the burden imposed severe. 
The district court in Strange viewed Casey as establishing and apply-
ing the Balancing Approach. The court did not rely as heavily as the 
Humble court on the confusing sentence in Casey regarding “unneces-
sary health regulations,” but, rather, relied in part on the Casey opin-
ion’s overall objective of finding a “middle way”:  a way between Jus-
tice Blackmun’s plea for preservation of Roe’s strict scrutiny analysis 
and Justice Rehnquist’s call for use of rational basis review.174  A mid-
dle ground between an approach that undervalues the state’s legiti-
mate interests in regulating abortion and an approach that is overly 
deferential to state regulation.175  The court in Strange repeatedly 
characterizes Casey’s middle approach as involving a balancing of 
both a woman’s right to an abortion and state interests; and points to 
that balancing as dictating use of the Balancing Approach.176 
And of course it is true that Casey involved balancing.  In Casey, 
Justice O’Connor sought to preserve the essence of Roe while modify-
ing abortion jurisprudence in a way that would better accommodate 
state laws furthering legitimate state interests.  In Part IV of the opin-
ion, Justice O’Connor characterized Roe as establishing that a wom-
an’s liberty interest includes some freedom to terminate her preg-
 
173 See id. at 1276 (quoting § 4(c) of the Women’s Health and Safety Act, codified at 1975 
Ala. Code § 26-23E-4(c)). 
174 See id. at 1281–83. (arguing that the Justice O’Connor decision is best understood in re-
sponse to both dissenting opinions). 
175 Id. at 1280. 
176 Id. at 1282–83.  The court points to Casey’s basic explanation that the undue burden anal-
ysis focuses on whether the challenged law poses a substantial obstacle, id. at 1282 (citing 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877), to (c) of Justice O’Connor’s “summary” of her explanation of the 
undue burden analysis (which includes the confusing sentence about “unnecessary” 
health laws), id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878), and also to the fact that the undue burden 
analysis is an approach between the retention of strict scrutiny championed by Justice 
Blackmun and use of only the rational basis inquiry as championed by Justice William 
Rehquist.  Id. at 1282–83 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and in the judgment and dissenting in part); Casey, 505 U.S. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
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nancy, but also affirmed that a woman’s freedom must give way to 
some state laws designed to further legitimate state interests.177  Jus-
tice O’Connor retained viability as the point before which the wom-
an’s freedom to terminate exists.178  That is, a state may not prohibit 
abortion previability.  In large part the retention of viability as the key 
temporal point limiting a state ban was due to O’Connor’s view of 
stare decisis:  “We have twice reaffirmed [Roe] in the face of great op-
position.”179  But she also repeated the explanation given in Roe:  that 
viability is the point when there is a 
realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the 
womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason 
and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the 
rights of the woman. . . .  And there is no other line than viability which is 
more workable.180 
It is thus fair to characterize Justice O’Connor’s decision to retain the 
point of viability as involving a balancing:  according to Roe and Jus-
tice O’Connor in Casey, it is at this point that the state’s interest can 
logically be said to override a woman’s interest in terminating her 
pregnancy, i.e., at this point the state’s interest becomes sufficiently 
weighty to justify a ban on termination.181 
Similarly, when Justice O’Connor rejected Roe’s trimester frame-
work which precluded any state regulation in the first trimester, and 
most other laws previability, the emerging question involved the 
“weight” of the state’s interest in protecting human life; i.e., identify-
ing when a state regulation of abortion ought to be allowed notwith-
standing some effect on access to abortion.182  Justice O’Connor re-
jected Roe’s crabbed approach and the trimester framework because 
they undervalued state interests and overvalued the women’s interest 
at stake.183  She replaced the trimester framework with the undue 
burden analysis.184  This also involved a balancing.  In her own words, 
the undue burden analysis “is the appropriate means of reconciling 
 
177 Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. 
178 Id. at 870. 
179 Id. (citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759; Akron I, 462 U.S. at 419–20). 
180 Id. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163). 
181 Id. (upholding Roe while overruling cases that did not adequately weigh the state’s inter-
est in regulating abortion); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (declaring viability as the point at 
which the state’s “important and legitimate interest in potential life” is compelling 
enough to justify regulation). 
182 Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (noting that the “weight to be given the state interest [in protecting 
human life], not the strength of the woman’s interest, was the difficult question faced in 
Roe;” and that the Court in Roe discounted the state interest). 
183 Id. at 872–73. 
184 See id. at 873–76; see also id. at 877–79. 
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the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liber-
ty.”185 
Thus, yes, the Casey opinion reflects balancing.  Balancing is what 
led to adoption of the undue burden analysis. The question, however, 
is whether Casey’s undue burden analysis itself involves balancing. 
The key sentences from Casey describing the undue burden analy-
sis were set out in Part I of this Article.  Nothing in Justice 
O’Connor’s description of the undue burden analysis suggests that 
the analysis involves weighing the extent to which a particular law 
achieves or furthers a state interest and balancing that against the 
burden the law imposes on access to abortion.  Rather, in picking the 
undue burden analysis, Justice O’Connor in essence determined that 
state laws should be allowed as long as they further a legitimate state 
interest—and so long as they do not have the effect of presenting a 
substantial obstacle to the woman’s interest in being able to legally 
decide to terminate a pregnancy. 
What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a 
right to be insulated from all others in doing so.  Regulations which do 
no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . . may 
express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they 
are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s right to choose. . . .  Regula-
tions designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are 
valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.186 
Stated another way, Justice O’Connor’s approach is the flip side of 
the approach in Roe.  Under Roe, state laws promoting interests such 
as the interest in human life or the interest in health and safety or in 
regulating the medical profession were never sufficiently weighty in 
the first trimester, and rarely ever sufficiently weighty previability.  
Under Casey, state laws furthering legitimate interests should be re-
spected and given effect as long as they do not pose a substantial ob-
stacle. 
The approach nonetheless is rightly considered a “middle-way.”  
Due to the addition of the substantial obstacle inquiry it provides 
more protection for the woman’s interest than the mere rational ba-
sis review approach advocated by Justice Rehnquist.  It also provides 
more room for state regulation than the strict scrutiny approach ad-
vocated by Justices Blackmun and Stevens by rejecting the need for a 
state to show that the interest is compelling or that the law is narrowly 
tailored.  But Casey’s adoption of a middle-way does not support use 
of the Balancing Approach as part of the undue burden analysis.  
 
185 Id. at 876. 
186 Id. at 877–78. 
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Further, the Balancing Approach substantially undermines the bal-
ance struck in Casey, and reintroduces aspects of strict scrutiny analy-
sis clearly rejected in Casey. 
B.  Reading Gonzales as Requiring Balancing and Empirical Evidence 
The Ninth Circuit in Humble and the district court in Van Hollen 
point to Gonzales for support of the Balancing Approach and, in par-
ticular, as requiring heightened scrutiny of the basis for a challenged 
abortion regulation.  Reading Gonzales as a reason for modifying the 
Casey analysis was most clearly articulated and relied on by the district 
court in Van Hollen.187  As noted, Van Hollen involved a challenge to a 
Wisconsin law prohibiting a physician from performing an abortion 
unless the physician has admitting privileges at a hospital no more 
than thirty miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed.  
The discussion of Van Hollen in Part II focused on Judge Posner’s re-
view of the state’s justification of the law and his endorsement of the 
Balancing Approach.  Here, the focus is on the explanation of the 
governing law provided by the district court—which Judge Posner 
implicitly affirmed. 
1.  Balancing in Gonzales 
The district court in Van Hollen set the stage for the Balancing 
Approach by its explanation of Casey.  In explaining the undue bur-
den analysis, the court noted that in Casey the Supreme Court “ap-
pears to have stepped back from requiring a ‘compelling state inter-
est’ to justify any limitation on access to abortion,” but that “[h]ow far 
back remains open to debate”188; and that the Court in Casey “express-
ly adopted [a] new, arguably less rigorous ‘undue burden’ standard,” 
and “acknowledged the government’s latitude to regulate abortion 
even during the first trimester for reasons of maternal health or fetal 
viability.”189  But, the court also emphasized that Casey did not over-
rule Roe v. Wade.190 
 
187 See Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *15. 
188 Id. at *12. 
189 Id. 
190 Id.  The court’s explanation is clearly erroneous on at least two counts.  First, the “undue 
burden” analysis was not expressly adopted by the Court in Casey, given that Part IV of 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion did not garner a majority of the Court.  See supra notes 33–34 
and accompanying text.  Second, the court also states that, under current Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, “a woman’s right to an abortion remains fundamental to the point of via-
bility.”  Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *13.  This is incorrect, given that at least seven 
Justices in Casey backed away from Roe’s “overvaluation” of a woman’s legitimate interest 
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Thereafter, the district court focused on Gonzales.  In some re-
spects, the district court’s description of Gonzales adhered closely to 
the two-pronged analysis used by lower courts:  “where the govern-
ment ‘has a rational basis to act’ and the restriction ‘does not impose 
an undue burden,’ the government ‘may use its regulatory power to 
bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its 
legitimate interest in regulating the medical profession in order to 
promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.’”191  But the 
court elsewhere described Gonzales as incorporating balancing into 
the Casey analysis.  In particular, the court described the outcome in 
Gonzales as follows:  “Ultimately, Justice Kennedy found that the ques-
tion of constitutionality came down to whether the government’s un-
questioned interest in ‘potential life’ and ‘protecting the integrity 
and ethics of the medical profession,’ . . . outweighed any health risks 
to women by the prohibition of [the] procedure.”192  And the court 
relied on this view of Gonzales in assessing the state law at issue: 
[T]he court considers these obstacles in access to abortion services [an] 
undue burden in light of the dubious benefits to women’s health [from] 
the admitting privileges restriction . . . .  Even if there were some evi-
dence that the admitting privileges requirement would actually further 
women’s health, any benefit is greatly outweighed by the burdens caused 
by increased travel, decreased access and, at least for some women, the 
denial of an in-state option for abortion services.193 
The district court’s conclusion in Van Hollen thus clearly hinged on 
the Balancing Approach. 
The district court in Van Hollen supported its statement that the 
outcome in Gonzales turned on whether the government’s interest 
outweighed health risks to women by citing to discussion in Gonzales 
addressing and finding that the ban furthers legitimate state interests 
in human life and integrity of the medical profession.194  The district 
continued by explaining that the majority in Gonzales deferred to 
Congress’s findings that the banned procedure had a “disturbing sim-
ilarity to the killing of a newborn infant” and would not impose sig-
nificant health risks on women.195  The court then stated:  “Accord-
 
relating to a decision to abort a pregnancy.  For these seven Justices, a woman simply has 
“some freedom to terminate a pregnancy,” Casey, 505 U.S. at 869, and for four of these 
Justices, state regulation of access to abortion can be justified if the law is rationally relat-
ed to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 981.  
191 Id. at *13 (citations omitted). 
192 Id. (emphasis added). 
193 Id. at *19. 
194 Id. at *13 (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157, 159). 
195 Id. (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158, 162). 
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ingly, the burden . . . was held not to be ‘undue,’ at least where alter-
natives are ‘available to the prohibited procedure that have extremely 
low rates of medical complications’ and are ‘generally the safest 
method of abortion during the second trimester.’”196  The implication 
is that the outcome in Gonzales hinged on balancing a strong state in-
terest against a minimal burden on women. 
However, careful analysis of Gonzales readily negates this charac-
terization.  The Court in Gonzales did not conduct a distinct analysis 
of what the lower courts consider as the first step in the Casey analysis.  
Rather, the decision turned on application of the second prong of 
the analysis:  assessing whether the purpose or effect of the chal-
lenged law is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking a previability abortion (Part IV of the opinion).197  The analy-
sis of the purpose of the law (Part IV(A)) turned on whether the law 
furthered legitimate government interests.198  After finding that the 
ban did so, the Court concluded:  “[W]e reject the contention that 
the congressional purpose of the Act was ‘to place a substantial obsta-
cle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.’”199 
The analysis next focused on whether the ban had the effect of 
imposing an undue burden given the absence of a health exception 
(Part IV(B)).200  The majority explained that, “under precedent we 
here assume to be controlling,” the ban would be unconstitutional “if 
it ‘subject[ed] [women] to significant health risks.”201  The analysis 
turned on the evidence.  Although the challengers presented evi-
dence that the banned procedure may be the safest method for some 
women in certain situations, the government presented contradicting 
evidence.202  The Court determined that the challengers’ evidence 
was insufficient to show that the law presented in undue burden.203  
The Court stated:  “The medical uncertainty over whether the Act’s 
prohibition creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis 
to conclude in this facial attack that the Act does not impose an un-
 
196 Id. (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164). 
197 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156. The majority also considered arguments that the federal ban is 
unconstitutionally vague and imposes an undue burden because its restrictions are over-
broad.  See id. at 148–50, 150–56. 
198 Id. at 157–60. 
199 Id. at 160 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
200 Id. at 161–64. 
201 Id. at 161 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328 
(2006)). 
202 Id. at 161–62 (noting also that courts had struggled with the issue). 
203 Id. at 164.  The majority also clarified that, rather than mounting a facial attack, the chal-
lengers should have pursued an “as-applied” challenge.  Id. at 167–68. 
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due burden.”  The majority bolstered that conclusion by pointing to 
other facts, namely, the availability of another safe method of abor-
tion commonly used in the second trimester. 
Nothing in the decision ties the two portions of the analysis to-
gether (Parts IV(A) and IV(B)) in any way that would support charac-
terizing the outcome as hinging on the Balancing Approach.  Noth-
ing in the analysis even remotely looks like the majority is assessing 
whether the government’s interest outweighed any health risks to 
women stemming from the federal ban. 
At the outset of the opinion (Part II), Justice Kennedy does de-
scribe Casey as striking a balance.204  The discussion of Casey leading to 
that statement readily paints the Casey analysis as reflecting a need to 
better accommodate state regulation of abortion that furthers legiti-
mate government interests—particularly government’s legitimate and 
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life.205  But 
again, recognizing the Casey analysis as effectuating a balance be-
tween a woman’s interest in access to abortion and the state’s interest 
in human life is not an invitation to introduce an additional balanc-
ing into the analysis established by Casey. 
To the Court in Gonzales, the crux of the challenge turned on 
whether the ban could survive a facial attack when the challengers’ 
evidence had cast substantial doubt on the state’s premise that a safe 
alternative method was always available.206  The Court pointed to the 
traditional principle of giving legislatures “wide discretion” in areas of 
medical and scientific uncertainty, noting that this traditional rule is 
consistent with Casey’s recognition that abortion jurisprudence must 
accommodate reasonable regulations furthering legitimate state in-
terests.207  The challengers’ evidence was therefore held to be insuffi-
cient to show that the effect of the law presented an undue burden.208  
No balancing was involved in reaching this conclusion. 
2.  Heightened Rational Basis Review 
The district court in Van Hollen also read Gonzales as directing 
courts to use a heightened standard when reviewing the basis for the 
challenged law.  At the trial in Van Hollen, the state had presented ev-
idence that the admitting privileges law helps to foster continuity of 
 
204 Id. at 146. 
205 Id. at 145–46. 
206 Id. at 162. 
207 Id. at 163. 
208 Id. at 164. 
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care and provision of competent care by the abortion provider.  The 
district court explained that, to the state, the evidence was sufficient 
given language in Gonzales according wide discretion to legislatures in 
areas where there is “medical and scientific uncertainty.”209  The dis-
trict court rejected the state’s view, noting on the one hand that the 
state’s submissions had failed to establish “a credible, medical disa-
greement.”210  But on the other hand, the court stressed two things.  
First, that the Court in Gonzales emphasized that courts have a duty to 
“review factual findings where constitution[al] rights are at stake.”211  
Second, that “Gonzales involved the weighing of medical uncertainty 
with respect to the potential negative impact on women’s health [re-
sulting from the ban] against the state’s compelling interests in re-
specting the life of the unborn and in the integrity and ethics of the 
medical community.”212  In this sentence, the district court seems to 
be suggesting two distinct ideas:  (1) that the outcome in Gonzales 
turned on a balancing (which has already been discussed), and (2) 
that deference to the legislature in light of uncertainty was only ap-
propriate because the case involved “compelling state interests.”  
That the district court used a heightened standard is confirmed by 
the court’s statement that “[e]ven under a more lenient standard of 
review, the ‘reasonably related’ requirement . . . still has signifi-
cance.”213 
Here also the district court’s statements and analysis reflect a seri-
ous misunderstanding of Gonzales.  As noted, the Court in Gonzales 
did not conduct a distinct analysis of the first step—or a relational in-
quiry—of the Casey analysis.  Rather, the decision turned on the 
Court’s assessment of whether the purpose or effect of the chal-
lenged law was to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking a pre-viability abortion.214  The analysis of the purpose of the 
law turned on whether the law furthered legitimate government in-
terests.215  The analysis of the effect of the law turned on an assessment 
of the evidence bearing on whether banning the procedure created a 
 
209 Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *15. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at *13,*15. 
212 Id. at *15. 
213 Id. at *15. 
214 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156.  The majority also considered arguments that the federal ban is 
unconstitutionally vague, id. at 148–50, and imposes an undue burden, because its re-
strictions are overbroad.  Id. at 150–56. 
215 As noted, the opinion thereby suggests a refinement to the Casey analysis that merges the 
relational inquiry into the basis of the law and purpose inquiry often considered part of 
the substantial obstacle inquiry.  See infra Part IV. 
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significant health risk; and it is in this portion of the opinion that the 
Court explicitly discussed deference to legislatures.  Importantly, 
both portions of the analysis shed light on the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to be used by courts when assessing the basis for a challenged 
abortion law. 
The Court’s purpose analysis confirms the appropriateness of def-
erential review of the basis for the law.  In the first part of the analysis, 
Justice Kennedy identified the relevant state interests and confirmed 
that precedent, including Casey, affirms the legitimacy of state inter-
ests in human life and the integrity of the medical profession.216  Re-
garding laws protecting the integrity of the medical profession, Jus-
tice Kennedy stated: 
Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue 
burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures 
and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regu-
lating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, includ-
ing life of the unborn.217 
The analysis then turned to the question whether the law furthered 
the government’s objectives.  Because the law only interfered with a 
decision about an abortion procedure used in a very small number of 
cases, and because the law left in place a standard procedure that is 
equally brutal as the banned procedure,218 the challengers had argued 
that the law did little to promote the government’s interest in the life 
of the unborn.  The Court determined, however, that the law passed 
scrutiny and, in doing so, the Court gave considerable deference to 
the legislature. 
To the objection that the law was not rational because it left in 
place equally brutal methods of abortion, the Court invoked the 
principle that legislatures are given room to draw boundaries or 
bright lines.  Here, the line was justified by a congressional finding 
that the partial birth abortion method was “disturbing[ly] similar[] to 
the killing of a newborn infant,” and Congress’s concern in distin-
 
216 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–58 (stating that the government “may use its voice and its regu-
latory authority to show its profound respect for . . . life” and that Casey’s recognition that 
abortion jurisprudence must accommodate state laws that further that interest “cannot be 
set at naught” by Casey’s requirement of a health exception). 
217 Id. at 158. 
218 Id. at 134–35, 140 (explaining that 85–90% of abortions occur in the first trimester; that 
most of the remaining 10–15% occur in the second trimester; that usual procedure used 
for second trimester abortions was not banned (the standard D & E procedure); and that 
another procedure exists and often is used for late second trimester abortions (medical 
induction)).  The majority’s description of both the standard D & E procedure and the 
banned “intact” D & E procedure made very clear that both procedures are very brutal.  
Id. at 135–40. 
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guishing abortion from infanticide.219  The opinion explains that the 
banned procedure—intact D & E—differs from a standard D & E 
“because the former occurs when the fetus is partially outside the 
mother to the point of one of the Act’s anatomical landmarks;” and 
thus it was “reasonable for Congress to think that partial-birth abor-
tion, more than standard D & E, ‘undermines the public’s perception 
of the appropriate role of a physician during the delivery process, 
and perverts a process during which life is brought into the world.’”220 
In a similarly deferential way, Justice Kennedy based the determi-
nation that the law furthered respect for human life on a “reasonable 
inference.”  More specifically, the opinion explains that the existence 
of the law would promote both (i) public knowledge of details of the 
partial-birth abortion procedure (which he suggests very often are 
not explained to women in clear and precise terms by abortion doc-
tors), and (ii) helpful public dialogue; and, therefore, “[i]t is a rea-
sonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation and the 
knowledge it conveys will be to encourage some women to carry the 
infant to full term . . . ,” or to encourage the medical profession to 
find “different and less shocking methods to abort the fetus in the se-
cond trimester . . . .”221 
The Court’s analysis of purpose, then, does not suggest a role for 
heightened judicial scrutiny into the assessment of whether a chal-
lenged law furthers a legitimate state interest.  Importantly, the opin-
ion does reflect that, in rational basis review, the judicial analysis is 
not a rubberstamp.  A court may, and should, assess the rationality of 
the argument that a law furthers a legitimate state interest.  But in 
concluding that a reasonable connection existed between the ban 
and legitimate state interests, the Court did not require evidence 
demonstrating the level of success in achieving the state interests and 
did not inquire as to the fit between the law and the interests.  Rea-
sonable assertions and reasonable inferences will suffice.  Character-
izing the decision as creating a role for heightened scrutiny or a need 
for empirical evidence is thus misplaced. 
 
219 Id. at 158. 
220 Id. at 160.  Justice Kennedy also drew support from Washington v. Glucksberg, noting that 
that case upheld a similar instance of line-drawing as being reasonable.  Id. at 158 (quot-
ing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732–35, n.23 (1997)).  
221 Id. at 160 (“The State’s interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue that better 
informs the political and legal systems, the medical profession, expectant mothers, and 
society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term 
abortion.”). 
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The analysis of the effect of the law similarly does not support use 
of heightened scrutiny.  As explained, the analysis turned on an as-
sessment of the evidence bearing on whether banning the procedure 
created a significant health risk.  The abortion doctors challenging 
the ban had presented evidence suggesting that the intact D & E pro-
cedure has some safety advantages:  e.g., they testified that the proce-
dure “decreases the risk of cervical laceration or uterine perforation 
because it requires fewer passes into the uterus with surgical instru-
ments and does not require the removal of bony fragments of the 
dismembered fetus;” and that it “reduces the risks that fetal parts will 
remain in the uterus.”222  However, other doctors had testified, both 
in litigation and before Congress, that the standard D & E procedure 
was “always a safe alternative.”223  Justice Kennedy noted that the disa-
greement was reflected in other litigation as well, although the lower 
courts had routinely found that the intact D & E procedure had some 
safety advantages for at least some women in some circumstances.224  
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the question was “whether the Act 
can stand when this medical uncertainty persists.”225 
That is, the issue was framed in terms of whether the law could 
survive a facial attack when the challengers’ evidence had cast sub-
stantial doubt on the state’s premise or assertion that a safe alterna-
tive method was always available.  The Court pointed to the tradition-
al principle of giving legislatures “wide discretion” in areas of medical 
and scientific uncertainty, noting that this traditional rule is con-
sistent with Casey’s recognition that abortion jurisprudence must ac-
commodate reasonable regulations furthering legitimate state inter-
ests.226  The opinion explains, in essence, that abortion jurisprudence 
should not treat abortion doctors differently than other physicians; 
that all physicians are subject to reasonable laws regulating the medi-
cal community.227  In support of taking this stance, the opinion cites 
precedent and includes parenthetical explanations highlighting (i) 
the inappropriateness of abortion jurisprudence that results in courts 
serving as “ex officio medical board[s] with powers to approve or dis-
approve medical and operative practices and standards throughout 
 
222 Id. at 161. 
223 Id. at 162. 
224 Id.  
225 Id. at 163. 
226 Id.  
227 Id. (“Physicians are not entitled to ignore regulations that direct them to use reasonable 
alternative[s] . . . . The law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the 
course of their medical practice, nor should it elevate their status above other physicians 
in the medical community.”). 
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the United States”228; and (ii) the appropriateness of abortion juris-
prudence that upholds state regulations relating to medical standards 
governing abortion even in the face of arguments that “all health evi-
dence contradicts the claim that there is any health basis for the 
law.”229  This discussion does not suggest a role for heightened scruti-
ny, but instead emphasizes that, even as to state laws with some effect 
on access to abortion, courts generally should give substantial defer-
ence to legislative choices in the arena of regulations furthering pa-
tient health and safety, and should give “wide discretion” if a law reg-
ulates in an area of medical uncertainty. 
The opinion does thereafter acknowledge that courts retain “an 
independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where con-
stitutional rights are at stake.”230  The acknowledgement was prompt-
ed, however, by the Attorney General’s contention that the federal 
ban should be upheld solely on the basis of congressional findings.231  
The opinion explains that uncritical deference to legislative fact find-
ing is inappropriate, because sometimes those finding are errone-
ous—as two of the factual findings were in the case of the federal ban 
at issue.232  Again, however, the discussion nowhere suggests the need 
for heightened scrutiny or empirical evidence as to the relational in-
quiry in the Casey analysis.  Stating that courts have a duty to review 
fact finding where constitutional rights are at stake simply acknowl-
edges that a role exists for judicial assessment of the basis for the 
challenged law.233 
Further, the discussion confirms that, in the substantial obstacle 
analysis, the burden of proof as to the degree of the burden lies with 
the challengers and that deference to state legislative findings can 
offset evidence of the burden.234  In the discussion related to the in-
dependent duty to review the basis for the law, Justice Kennedy ex-
 
228 Id. at 163–64 (citing Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)). 
229 Id. at 164 (citing Mazurek, 520 U.S. 968). 
230 Id. at 165. 
231 Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner in No. 05-380, at 23). 
232 Id. at 165–66 (pointing to a finding that no medical schools provide instruction on intact 
D & E, and a finding that there exists “a medical consensus” that intact D & E is never 
medically necessary). 
233 The case cited in support of the proposition does not direct courts to use a heightened 
standard, but, rather, simply instructs courts to review findings of fact made by adminis-
trative agencies in agency adjudications when the facts are relevant to constitutional 
claims.  See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
234 The Court held that the challengers’ evidence was insufficient to show that the law pre-
sented an undue burden.  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164.  The majority also clarified that, ra-
ther than mounting a facial attack, the challengers should have pursued an “as-applied” 
challenge.  Id. at 167–68. 
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plicitly rejected the doctors’ argument that the existence of “substan-
tial medical authority” undermining the government’s position was 
sufficient to invalidate the challenged law.235  He rejected the argu-
ment because use of that standard would allow courts to strike down 
legitimate abortion regulations “if some part of the medical commu-
nity were disinclined to follow the proscription.”236  He instead reiter-
ated:  “Considerations of marginal safety, including the balance of 
risks, are within the legislative competence when the regulation is ra-
tional and in pursuit of legitimate ends.”237 
Gonzales therefore does not support heightened review of the basis 
for a state abortion law, but, rather, in reality largely confirms the 
traditional approach to review of the basis for legislative action:  def-
erence to the legislature is appropriate, and even substantial contrary 
evidence is not a reason for invalidating a law if some medical or sci-
entific uncertainty exists—as long as the government can articulate 
some reasonable connection between the law and a legitimate state 
interest.  It is therefore not accurate to read Gonzales as employing 
more rigorous review of the basis for state laws regulating abortion.  
In the analysis of both the purpose and the effect of the law, the ma-
jority opinion largely confirms use of traditional rational basis review.  
A state remains able to support a law by pointing to a reasonable 
connection between the law and the legislature’s objectives, and em-
pirical evidence is not required as even a reasonable inference suf-
ficed in Gonzales. 
C.  Implicit Signals in Casey 
Courts adopting the Balancing Approach have also relied on im-
plicit signals in Casey.  The courts in Humble and Strange point to Ca-
sey’s application of the undue burden analysis to the spousal notifica-
tion provision at issue; and the district court in Strange developed two 
additional arguments grounded on the use of citations in Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion. 
1.  Analysis of the Spousal Notification Requirement 
Both the Ninth Circuit in Humble and the district court in Strange 
explained the application of the substantial obstacle analysis in the 
Casey opinion in a way that, if valid, would support taking into ac-
 
235 Id. at 166. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
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count the weight of the state’s interest.238  Specifically, the courts fo-
cused on Casey’s view that the parental notification and consent pro-
visions were permissible, but that the spousal notification provision 
was not permissible.  Both courts suggest that the Court in Casey dis-
tinguished the parental consent law from the spousal notification law 
based on the state’s comparatively weaker justification for the spousal 
notification.239  The court in Strange included the following quote 
from Casey. 
[P]arental-consent] enactments, and our judgment that they are consti-
tutional, are based on the quite reasonable assumption that minors will 
benefit from consultation with their parents and that children will often 
not realize that their parent have their best interests at heart.  We cannot 
adopt a parallel assumption about adult women.240 
To the court in Strange, this supported its view that the outcome in 
Casey turned on consideration of the extent the provision furthered 
the state’s interest. 
This reading of Casey is not convincing.  Justice O’Connor’s dis-
cussion of the spousal notification provision spans eleven and one-
half pages and she nowhere in the analysis discussed the extent to 
which the requirement furthers the state interest being promoted by 
the law.241  In the first half of the analysis, Justice O’Connor focused 
solely on the effect of the law on women—and, in particular, on 
women who may be victims of domestic violence and who thus have 
reasons to fear notifying their spouse.242  After discussing data of vari-
ous sorts highlighting the reality of domestic violence, Justice 
O’Connor concluded that, for these women, the spousal notification 
requirement likely would deter abortions “as surely as if the Com-
monwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.”243  That is, the effect 
of the provision went to the decision making process itself.  She thus 
concluded that the requirement was an undue burden and invalid.244 
 
238 See Humble, 753 F.3d at 913.  The Ninth Circuit followed this discussion by noting that the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 had adopted a balancing approach.  
Id. at 913–17; see also Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1287 (summary judgment). 
239 See Humble, 753 F.3d at 913 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 895); Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1287 
(summary judgment). 
240 Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1287 (summary judgment). 
241 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887–98. 
242 See id. at 887–95. 
243 Id. at 893–94. 
244 Id. at 895.  It is in this part of the opinion that Justice O’Connor muddies the waters re-
garding the proper standard in facial challenges.  The state had pointed out that the law 
would have that effect in less than one percent of women seeking abortions, and thus that 
the law could not be found invalid on its face.  Justice O’Connor disagreed, noting that 
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Immediately following this conclusion, Justice O’Connor distin-
guished parental notification or consent requirements, using the lan-
guage quoted above and relied on by the court in Strange.  Because 
the entirety of the analysis had focused on the effect on women, the 
reasonable implication is that Justice O’Connor meant the statement 
to pertain to the effect of the parental notification on access to abor-
tion by minors, and not as relating to the state’s interest.  Further-
more, the statement reasonably can be read that way.  Consultation 
with parents might result in parents agreeing and supporting the mi-
nor’s choice to abort a pregnancy.  Or, it might result in parents per-
suading a minor that abortion is not the best choice and supporting 
the minor as she carries the child to full term.  The point is that the 
effect of requiring a minor to consult with parents likely operates to 
the benefit and not the detriment of the minor—and in many cases a 
minor may not realize the benefits of consultation and fear consulta-
tion.  In contrast, the effect of the spousal notification requirement 
would not so likely operate to the benefit of a woman who does not 
want to consult with her spouse. 
In the remainder of the discussion of the spousal notification re-
quirement, Justice O’Connor elaborated on the mother’s liberty in-
terest (seemingly to bolster her view that the effect of the law struck 
at the essence of the woman’s interest—the right to make the deci-
sion itself).245  The application of the undue burden analysis to the 
spousal notification requirement therefore does not support the Bal-
ancing Approach. 
2.  Citations 
To bolster its characterization of Casey as establishing the Balanc-
ing Approach, the court in Strange developed arguments grounded in 
citations used by Justice O’Connor:  specifically, a citation to ballot-
 
“in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substan-
tial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.”  Id. 
245 Id. at 895–98.  In particular, Justice O’Connor presents several reasons why—as to state 
regulations relating to a child prior to birth—a mother’s liberty interest outweighs the fa-
ther’s interest in the welfare of the child.  She agreed that, as to a child after its birth who 
is being raised by both parents, the father’s interest and the mother’s interest are equal.  
Id. at 895–96.  But she concluded that the “Constitution does not permit a State to re-
quire a married woman to obtain her husband’s consent before undergoing an abortion.”  
Id. at 897.  Much of her reasoning relates to women in situations of domestic violence, 
but she also based her conclusion on concerns that a spousal notification requirement 
would give a husband a “troubling degree of authority over his wife”—and would resur-
rect outdated conceptions of marriage and the nature of women’s rights.  Id. at 897–98. 
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access box cases and a citation to Doe v. Bolton,246 the companion case 
to Roe v. Wade.  Neither argument is persuasive. 
(a) The Ballot-Access Cases 
In Casey, after rejecting Roe’s trimester framework but before in-
troducing the undue burden standard, Justice O’Connor stated: 
As our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps abortion has 
recognized, not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise 
is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right.  [For example, we] have held 
that not every ballot access limitation amounts to an infringement of the 
right to vote.  Rather, the States are granted substantial flexibility in es-
tablishing the framework within which voters choose the candidates for 
whom they wish to vote.247 
She followed the statement with a citation to two cases:  Anderson v. 
Celebrezze and Norman v. Reed. 248  The court in Strange decided that the 
citation was intended to support “more than just the narrow point 
that not every regulation of abortion is unconstitutional.”249  Rather, 
the court construed the citation as indicating that these particular 
cases reflected the type of analysis Justice O’Connor intended to be 
established through the adoption of the undue burden analysis.250 
As interpreted by the court in Strange, Anderson, and Norman re-
flect an analysis that asks a court to weigh both the obstacles abortion 
regulations create for women seeking abortions and the nature and 
strength of the state’s justification for the laws.251  That is, in applying 
the undue burden analysis, “the ‘character and magnitude of the as-
serted injury,’ affects whether the ‘corresponding interest [is] suffi-
ciently weighty to justify the limitation.’”252  To the court, assessing the 
relationship between the obstacle and the state justification is the 
“heart of the test”:  in short, the test is whether the obstacles imposed 
are greater than is warranted by the state’s justification.253 
This argument suffers from significant shortcomings.  As an initial 
matter, the analysis in the Anderson and Norman cases—as interpreted 
by the court in Strange—is not the analysis described by Justice 
O’Connor and applied to the state laws in Casey.  As detailed, the 
 
246 Bolton, 410 U.S. 179. 
247 Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873–74 (1992). 
248 Id. at 874 (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 
780 (1983)). 
249 Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1284 (summary judgment). 
250 Id. at 1283–84 (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 288–89; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 
251 Id. at 1280 & 1283–84 (citing Norman, 502 U.S. 279; Anderson, 460 U.S. 780). 
252 Id. at 1284 (citing Norman, 502 U.S. at 288–89; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 
253 Id. at 1287. 
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analysis developed by Justice O’Connor in Casey does not include a 
balancing inquiry and readily accommodates state laws furthering le-
gitimate state interests (i.e., laws with a valid purpose), as long as the 
effect of the laws does not place a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman’s freedom to decide to terminate a pregnancy.  There is no 
reason to give more importance to Justice O’Connor’s use of a cita-
tion than to the text of the opinion itself. 
Moreover, a careful reading of the Anderson and Norman cases re-
veals several reasons why the Strange court is wrong to claim that the 
cases are the “key” to understanding the undue burden analysis.254  
First, the rights at issue in the cases are different than in the abortion 
context.  The rights at issue in Anderson and Norman were the right of 
politicians or political parties to get onto state ballots and corre-
sponding rights of voters.255  The Court in Anderson explained that the 
impact of candidate eligibility requirements on voters implicates both 
the right of qualified voters to cast votes effectively and the right of 
association to advance political beliefs—rights that the Court readily 
characterized as fundamental, and as rights “among our most pre-
cious.”256  In contrast, although Justice O’Connor in Casey described a 
woman’s interests relating to abortion in rather sweeping terms,257 
seven Justices in Casey declined to characterize the right at stake as 
fundamental, and Justice O’Connor characterized the right only as 
“some freedom” to terminate a pregnancy previability (and thereafter 
if necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother):258  a freedom 
arising because of the personal nature of the decision, and its rela-
tion to personal dignity and autonomy,259 but a nonetheless limited 
freedom because abortion “is an act fraught with consequences for 
others.”260 
 
254 Cf. id. at 1284–85 (explaining how Casey’s rejection of tiers of scrutiny, a concept stated in 
Anderson and Norman, is the focus of the undue burden analysis). 
255 See Norman, 502 U.S. at 282 (affirming in part and reversing in part a decision of the Illi-
nois Supreme Court to bar candidates from running under a political party label in an 
election); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786–87 (explaining how candidate eligibility requirements 
affect the rights of voters). 
256 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787–88, n.7 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 
(1968)). 
257 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851–52 (describing abortion rights as those that are central to hu-
man dignity and autonomy). 
258 See id. at 869, 879 (explaining how women have a constitutional freedom to terminate 
their pregnancy, holding that a state cannot outlaw a woman from terminating her preg-
nancy before viability). 
259 See id. at 851–53 (explaining how an abortion decision is central to personal dignity and 
autonomy). 
260 Id. at 852. 
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Second, although the Court in Anderson used the language quoted 
in Strange in describing the analysis used for assessing the constitu-
tionality of state regulations infringing on the rights at issue,261 the 
Court’s application of the analysis in Anderson strongly resembles the 
second prong of strict scrutiny:  the restrictions were invalidated be-
cause they were “not necessary,”262 were not the “best means to the 
end,”263 were not “essential,”264 were not “precisely drawn,” and be-
cause a “less drastic” way of furthering its legitimate interests was 
available.265  This aspect of the analysis was confirmed when the Court 
in Norman explained the analysis as follows: 
To the degree that a State would thwart [the] interest by limiting the ac-
cess of new parties to the ballot, we have called for the demonstration of 
a corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation, (ci-
tations omitted), and we have accordingly required any severe restriction 
to be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling im-
portance.266 
Because Norman was decided just five months prior to Casey, it is rea-
sonable to assume that Justice O’Connor was aware that the ballot-
access cases mirrored to a considerable extent strict scrutiny analysis.  
Yet in Casey, Justice O’Connor and six other Justices explicitly reject-
ed use of a strict scrutiny approach. 
Moreover, in reality, the undue burden analysis as described and 
applied in Casey resembles not the analysis described and used by the 
majority in Anderson, but, rather, resembles somewhat the analysis de-
scribed by the dissenting Justices in Anderson—which included Justice 
O’Connor.  The dissenting Justices in Anderson chided the majority 
for missing the point that, in cases like the one at hand, 
we have never required that States meet some kind of “narrowly tailored” 
standard in order to pass constitutional muster.  [Rather,] we have said 
before that a court’s job is to ensure that the State “in no way freezes the 
status quo, but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity of American 
political life.”  (Citations omitted.)  If it does not freeze the status quo, 
 
261 Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1284 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789) (summary judgment). 
262 See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 797, 800 (explaining how the measure at issue was not necessary 
to the efficient operation of elections). 
263 See id. at 798 (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 770 (1976)) (disparaging Ohio’s ballot notification measure as one that impermissi-
bly closes communication to the public). 
264 See id. at 803 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 (1974) (describing how a ballot 
measure that was deemed essential in prior case was constitutional)). 
265 See id. at 806 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Kusper v. Pontikes, 
414 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1973)) (showing how when our most precious freedoms, such as the 
right to vote, are regulated, the reglulations must be precise and necessary to satisfying 
the applicable state interest). 
266 Norman, 502 U.S. at 288–89. 
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then the State’s laws will be upheld if they are “tied to a particularized le-
gitimate purpose, and [are] in no sense invidious or arbitrary.”267 
This analysis has obvious parallels to the analysis in Casey.  It seeks to 
accommodate state laws designed to further legitimate state interests, 
up to the point at which a state infringement goes too far:  when the 
law “freezes the status quo.”  The analysis also is much closer to the 
sentiment expressed in the sentence in Casey to which the citation to 
Anderson and Norman is attached—wherein Justice O’Connor said 
that, in the arena of ballot access limitations, “the States are granted 
substantial flexibility in establishing the framework within which vot-
ers choose the candidates for whom they wish to vote.”268  Thus, if one 
wants to read the use of Justice O’Connor’s citation to the Anderson 
and Norman cases as an implicit signal as to the “key” to the undue 
burden standard, it seems considerably more likely that Justice 
O’Connor was thinking of the analysis she agreed with in Anderson.  
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Justice O’Connor listed 
Anderson first in the citation, even though Norman ordinarily would be 
listed first since it is the more recent decision.  Thus the theory that 
the citation to Anderson and Norman supports use of the Balancing 
Approach simply does not withstand scrutiny. 
(b) Bolton v. Doe 
In the opinion issued following the trial, the court in Strange in-
cluded one additional argument supporting its adoption of the bal-
ancing approach.  Specifically, the court found Doe v. Bolton to be 
particularly instructive to the issue of the proper application of the 
substantial obstacle analysis.269 The court explained that Bolton in-
volved, in part, a challenge to a law requiring abortions to be per-
formed in a hospital setting and that, in Casey, the plurality cited Bol-
ton approvingly.270 According to the court in Strange, the Supreme 
Court struck down the law in Bolton, finding that the challengers’ evi-
dence showed that alternative clinic settings with appropriate staff 
and facilities were “entirely adequate to perform abortions” and that 
the state’s evidence did not show that the law was necessary to its in-
terest in health and safety.271  The court noted:  “despite acknowledg-
 
267 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 817 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 
410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973)). 
268 Casey, 505 U.S. at 873–74. 
269 Strange, 3 F. Supp. 3d. at 1339 (citing Doe, 410 U.S. 179) (post-trial motion). 
270 Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–75). 
271 Id. at 1340 (quoting Doe, 410 U.S. at 195). 
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ing the State’s legitimate interest in protecting women’s health, the 
Court [in Bolton] carefully considered the evidence on the degree to 
which the hospital regulation would actually advance that interest;” 
the Court “required the State to establish, through evidence, that the 
regulation really was strongly justified.”272  The court in Strange thus 
concluded:  “This approach . . . laid a foundation for the analysis 
mandated by Casey and articulated by this court.”273 
This theory also fails to withstand scrutiny.  Foremost, careful 
reading of the Casey opinion shows that Justice O’Connor cited to Bol-
ton as part of the discussion relating to rejection of the trimester 
framework set out in Roe.  In the Casey opinion, she first confirmed 
the “essential aspect of Roe” (that a woman has some freedom to 
terminate her pregnancy prior to viability);274 emphasized that the 
right has never been absolute, given the many consequences impact-
ing others;275 and explained one aspect of the flawed trimester frame-
work (that it overvalues the pregnant woman’s interest).276  She then 
explained that abortion jurisprudence should focus instead on 
whether the challenged state law impacting freedom to abort imposes 
an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make the decision.277  She 
stated:  “For the most part, the Court’s early abortion cases adhered 
to this view,” and the citation to Bolton follows (along with other cas-
es).278  Justice O’Connor continued the discussion by explaining an-
other aspect of the flawed trimester framework:  that it undervalues 
the state’s interests.279  The key point she was making is that the un-
due burden analysis will strike a more appropriate balance because 
“not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted.”280  The citation to 
Bolton is thus in the middle of that portion of the opinion where Jus-
tice O’Connor is making the case for shifting away from the trimester 
framework to an “undue burden analysis.” 
It therefore is not convincing to assert that the citation was in-
tended to signal anything about the proper application of the undue 
 
272 Id. at 1340–41. 
273 Id. 
274 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–70 (explaining a woman has some freedom to end her preg-
nancy). 
275 See id. at 871, 852 (classifying abortion as a unique act that has consequences for others). 
276 See id. at 872–73 (declaring the trimester approach to misunderstand the pregnant wom-
an’s interest). 
277 See id. at 873–76 (holding the Due Process Clause only invalidates abortion regulations 
when they pose an undue burden on a woman’s decision to have an abortion). 
278 Id. at 874–75. 
279 Id. at 875. 
280 Id. at 876. 
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burden analysis.  Justice O’Connor did not begin discussing how the 
analysis should be applied until after she had made the case for 
adopting the analysis.  Stated another way, it is immediately after 
making the case for adopting the analysis that she began a descrip-
tion of how the analysis should be applied by explaining:  “A finding 
of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state 
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”281  It simply isn’t plausi-
ble, then, to assert that the citation to Bolton has bearing on how to 
apply to substantial obstacle analysis. 
Further, the court in Strange has attempted to use the citation to 
Bolton as support for substantially diluting the substantial obstacle 
analysis.  The court emphasized that, in Bolton, the Court’s analysis 
hinged on scrutiny of the evidence for a showing by the state of the 
degree to which the challenged state furthered a legitimate state in-
terest; that the Court “required the State to establish, through evi-
dence, that the regulation really was strongly justified.”282  This tactic 
(which also reflects a misreading of Bolton)283 represents a misunder-
standing of Casey.  Seven Justices in Casey were seeking to modify 
abortion jurisprudence to better accommodate state laws furthering 
legitimate state interests.  Nothing in Casey or Gonzales emphasizes the 
 
281 Id. at 877. 
282 See Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1341 (M.D. Ala.), as 
corrected (Oct. 24, 2014) (post-trial motion). 
283 Several aspects of the Strange court’s description of Bolton are erroneous.  First, the Court 
in Bolton invalidated the provision requiring that abortions be performed in a hospital 
because it failed to exclude abortions performed in the first trimester.  Bolton, 410 U.S. at 
195.  The other discussion related to evidence was dicta only.  See id. at 194–95 (beginning 
the paragraph as follows:  “This is not to say that Georgia may not or should not, from 
and after the end of the first trimester, adopt standards for licensing all facilities where 
abortions may be performed so long as those standards are legitimately related to the ob-
jective the State seeks to accomplish.”).  Second, the analysis in Bolton as to the three chal-
lenged provisions focused almost exclusively on one simple issue:  whether the provisions 
furthered state interests.  See id. at 193 (noting that JCAH accreditation had “no present 
particularized concern with abortion as a medical or surgical procedure”); id. at 197–98 
(noting that the committee approval requirement would not further a state interest in 
potential life because a physician would have already made a “medical judgment,” nor 
necessary to protect hospitals and thus “serves neither the hospital nor the State); id. at 
199 (noting that the two-physician concurrence “has no rational connection” to maternal 
health given that a woman’s physician must make the same decision).  Nothing in the 
analysis suggests a balancing approach hinging on the weight of the state interests versus 
the extent of the burden on a women’s freedom to abort.  Third, the analysis does not 
support use of any heightened scrutiny when assessing whether the law furthers state in-
terests.  As to each provision, the Court simply found no connection between the provi-
sion and the state interests.  Id. at 195, 217, 220. 
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need for a state to prove with evidence the degree to which a state law 
will be successful in fulfilling the state’s legitimate interest. 
V.  APPROPRIATE REFINEMENTS TO THE CASEY ANALYSIS AND OTHER 
CONSIDERATIONS 
The many distinct analyses in this article highlight several im-
portant points relating to refinements to the Casey analysis.  Fore-
most, none of the rationales developed by the courts embracing the 
Balancing Approach are persuasive.  In short, nothing in Casey or 
Gonzales legitimately supports analyzing laws designed to advance 
state interests in health and safety differently from laws advancing 
other legitimate state interests; or engaging in an evidentiary assess-
ment of the extent to which an abortion law promotes legitimate state 
interests and in-turn using the result of that assessment to lower the 
standard used in deciding whether a law presents a substantial obsta-
cle.  What Casey and Gonzales do support is an analysis that genuinely 
respects and better accommodates state laws furthering legitimate 
state interests—while recognizing that constitutional principles allow 
women some freedom to terminate a pregnancy.  In working out the 
standard to be used to decide whether a law impacting ready access to 
abortion should be upheld or invalidated, it must be remembered 
that, although three Justices settled on the substantial obstacle stand-
ard, four other Justices opined that the substantial obstacle standard 
was too high.  Thus any refinement that dilutes the standard is at 
odds with the majority view in Casey. 
Similarly, any refinement that introduces heightened review of the 
legislative basis for the law or requires “narrowly tailored” laws is at 
odds with Casey and Gonzales.  Seven Justices in Casey rejected use of 
strict scrutiny in the context of abortion regulation.  Further, none of 
these seven Justices were in favor of lesser forms of heightened scru-
tiny:  the opinions are devoid of any language requiring or suggesting 
that, to be permissible, state laws must be “substantially related to suf-
ficiently important state interests,” or “substantially related to legiti-
mate state interests.”284  Rather, Justice O’Connor and the four Justic-
es favoring only rational basis review spoke only in terms of state laws 
reasonably related to legitimate state interests.  The Gonzales decision 
readily confirmed that approach. 
 
284 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985) (ex-
plaining various forms of heightened scrutiny). 
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Moreover, there is no reason for heightened scrutiny in the con-
text of legislation relating to abortion.  Heightened scrutiny of the 
legislative basis for a law was developed to protect constitutional 
rights deemed fundamental, or to protect against legislative classifica-
tions based on factors that ordinarily are not relevant, such as race, 
alienage, national origin, gender, or illegitimacy—classifications that 
therefore very likely reflect “prejudice and antipathy.”285  In these sit-
uations, the general rule that legislation is presumed valid falls away, 
opening the door to judicial scrutiny of the appropriateness of the 
law.  Casey points away from heightened scrutiny in the abortion con-
text.  Seven Justices in Casey expressly backed away from Roe’s vision 
of a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy.  Seven Justices in 
Casey also recognized and acknowledged that state regulation relating 
to abortion is not “very likely” driven by prejudice and antipathy, but, 
rather, is driven by a variety of legitimate state interests that must be 
respected given that a decision to abort a pregnancy is an act “fraught 
with consequences for others.”286  There is thus no reason to deviate 
from the standard paradigm of judicial restraint.  As recognized by 
the Fifth Circuit in Abbott II in rejecting the Balancing Approach, this 
“rule of restraint” respects the legislative process.287  The Casey analy-
sis, as modeled by the Court in Casey and Gonzales, allows courts to 
guard against prejudice and antipathy by ensuring that a challenged 
law relating to abortion furthers—i.e., is reasonably related to—
legitimate state interests.  If so, the analysis requires courts to uphold 
the law unless the effect of the law rises to the level of a substantial 
obstacle.  The inclusion of the substantial obstacle element is the 
means by which Justice O’Connor raised the undue burden analysis 
beyond mere rational basis review. 
 
285 Id.; see also Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313–15 (noting that judicial intervention may be 
necessary where an inference of antipathy exists). 
286 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
287 See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.  As the Supreme Court has explained: 
The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even im-
provident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that 
judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may 
think a political branch has acted. . . . 
[T]hose attacking the rationality of the [law] have the burden “to negative every 
conceivable basis which might support it,” . . . . Moreover, because we never re-
quire a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrel-
evant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged 
[law] actually motivated the legislature. . . . [A] legislative choice is not subject to 
courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by 
evidence or empirical data.  ‘Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle 
of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its 
rightful independence and its ability to function.’ 
  Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 314–15. (citations omitted). 
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Importantly, however, study of Casey and Gonzales also suggests 
that the traditional or standard articulation of (or approach to) the 
Casey analysis reflected in lower court decisions should be modified.  
Lower courts applying the Casey analysis have tended to view it as con-
sisting of two steps, articulated as follows:  the analysis requires, first, 
an assessment of the basis for the law; and, second, an assessment of 
whether the law imposes an undue burden—i.e., whether the pur-
pose or effect of the law places a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion.288  The Gonzales decision clarifies a useful 
refinement to this vision of the Casey analysis—a refinement that 
merges the relational inquiry in what lower courts consider as step-
one of the Casey analysis, with the purpose inquiry in step-two. 
In Gonzales, the Court did not conduct what lower courts would 
consider a “step-one” analysis.  Rather the decision hinged on the 
question whether the purpose or effect of the federal ban was to 
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a 
previability abortion (Part IV).289  The analysis of the purpose of the 
law turned on whether the law furthered a legitimate government in-
terest (Part IV(A)).290  As discussed, using a deferential approach to 
the question and in part based on reasonable inferences, the Court 
found that the ban furthered legitimate state interests.291  Based on 
that finding, the Court rejected the challenger’s claim that the con-
gressional purpose of the Act was to “place a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”292  Under this approach, a 
finding that a law furthers a legitimate state interest suffices to take 
purpose out of the substantial obstacle inquiry, or, stated another 
way, streamlines the substantial obstacle analysis by allowing a court 
to focus only on the effect of the law.293 
 
288 As to the first step in the analysis the key disagreement between courts adopting and 
courts rejecting the Balancing Approach has been whether to use a traditional rational 
basis inquiry (as emphasized by the Fifth Circuit) or to require empirical evidence of the 
extent to which the challenged law furthered state interests (as endorsed by Judge Pos-
ner).  As explained, the Gonzales decision does not support requiring states to prove with 
empirical evidence that a challenged abortion law furthers state interests, and confirms 
appropriateness of resort to traditional rational basis review. 
289 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156–67. 
290 Id. at 156–60. 
291 Id.; see also supra Part III(B)(2). 
292 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 160. 
293 But see June Med. Servs., LLC v. Kliebert, No. 14-525-JWD-RLB, 2015 WL 2239877, at *12–
13 (M.D. La. May 12, 2015)  (declining to adopt the argument offered by the Louisiana 
Department of Health and Hospitals that circuit precedent finding that the challenged 
abortion regulation furthers a legitimate state interest took the “purpose” inquiry off the 
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This way of understanding the Casey analysis is fully consistent with 
Justice O’Connor’s explanation of the undue burden analysis.  Justice 
O’Connor explained in Casey that “[a] finding of an undue burden is 
a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the pur-
pose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a non-viable fetus.”294  Yet, as Justice O’Connor 
continued to provide guidance regarding the analysis, she focused on 
the idea that permissible laws regulating abortion must have a valid 
purpose or further state interests:  laws designed to serve legitimate 
interests (laws designed to further the interest in human life, or laws 
designed to foster the health or safety of a woman seeking an abor-
tion) “will be upheld if reasonably related” to the legitimate inter-
est—but only if “they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s 
exercise of the right to choose.”295  By way of example, she explained 
that a state law “designed to persuade [a woman] to choose child-
birth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal” 
—“[u]nless it has the effect [of a substantial obstacle] on her right of 
choice.”296  It also is fully consistent with the important role of the re-
lational inquiry:  that of guarding against prejudice and antipathy by 
ensuring that a challenged law relating to abortion furthers legiti-
mate state interests.  Accordingly, the better way of articulating the 
Casey analysis is as follows: 
The analysis consists of an inquiry into purpose and effect:  (1) a rela-
tional inquiry focusing on the purpose of the law, namely, whether the law 
is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest (e.g., the life of the un-
born child, the health and safety of the mother or unborn child, the in-
tegrity of the medical profession, education of the community, etc.); and 
(2) an inquiry focusing on whether the effect of the law is to place a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a previability abortion.297 
This formulation of the analysis retains a two-step approach, but each 
step is focused on a distinct inquiry:  the purpose or legislative basis 
of the law in one step, and the effect of the law in the other. 
 
table, for the reason that the circuit court of appeals approached the analysis in the tradi-
tional two-stepped way ). 
294 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
295 Id. at 877–78. 
296 Id. at 878 (emphasis added).  She also reiterated the flip side of the equation:  even a law 
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest is impermissible if the law imposes a sub-
stantial obstacle on a woman’s decision to abort previability.  Id. at 877 (“[W]e answer the 
question, left open in previous opinions discussing the undue burden formulation, 
whether a law designed to further the State’s interest in fetal life which imposes an undue 
burden on the woman’s decision before fetal viability could be constitutional.  The an-
swer is no.” (citation omitted)). 
297 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing the Casey analysis in this way). 
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This refinement also makes clear that the analysis does not de-
pend on the nature of the state interests being advanced by the chal-
lenged state law and, importantly, preserves the concept of substan-
tial obstacle as a meaningful standard for assessing the 
constitutionality of abortion restrictions.  The district court in Strange 
had defended the Balancing Approach in part precisely because it 
undermined the substantial obstacle standard.  The court explained: 
If the severity of the burdens imposed has nothing to do with the 
strength of the reasons for those burdens, then courts are left to articu-
late a one-size-fits-all definition of “substantial obstacle” applicable re-
gardless of the weight of the governmental interests at stake. 
This approach is hopelessly unworkable.  If the one-size-fits-all level of 
“substantial obstacle” is set too low, then courts will be instructed to strike 
down regulations even in the face of compelling health consequences, an 
outcome no one desires.  If, on the other hand, the one-size-fits-all level 
of “substantial obstacle” is set too high, then essentially all abortion regu-
lation would be permitted, no matter how severe the burdens and how 
slight the governmental interests.298 
The court in Strange is right that setting the standard at the wrong 
point would be problematic.  Indeed that was the whole point of the 
shift in abortion jurisprudence in Casey.  Roe and its progeny had set 
the bar too high:  requiring that challenged laws survive strict scrutiny 
(i.e., the laws must have been narrowly tailored and designed to ad-
vance compelling state interests), and miscalculating the point at 
which state interests would become compelling.  Justice O’Connor 
adjusted the standard to better accommodate state laws furthering 
legitimate state interests. 
But that the substantial obstacle standard remains to be applied 
on a case-by-case basis does not render it unworkable.  Justice 
O’Connor intended the standard to be definite and meaningful.  She 
believed that courts could identify the appropriate point at which a 
burden would infringe too greatly on a woman’s limited freedom to 
decide to abort.  In her vision, that point would be consistent with the 
name she selected “substantial”; and thus not merely “slight” as it 
could be in a case using the Balancing Approach.  Preserving the 
standard as envisioned by Justice O’Connor is central to maintaining 
the overarching objective in Casey—modifying abortion jurispru-
dence to better accommodate state regulation of abortion furthering 
legitimate state interests. 
In reality, the emerging use of the Balancing Approach largely re-
flects judges attempting to give effect to their subjective views that re-
 
298 Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1293 (summary judgment). 
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cent state legislative initiatives should not be permitted because the 
effect of the laws—although not “substantial”—warrants invalidation.  
The laws at issue impact the ease with which abortion providers such 
as Planned Parenthood can maintain and set up abortion clinics.  In 
enacting admitting privileges laws or laws establishing higher stand-
ards for facilities where abortions are carried out—or laws aimed at 
ensuring that woman have appropriate guidance and assistance, 
whether for surgical or medication induced abortions—state legisla-
tures are acting primarily to prevent the potential for substandard 
care in the context of abortion.  This concern is reasonable in light of 
known instances of substandard care (see Appendix), and reasonable 
even if instances of substandard care are somewhat rare.299  Planned 
Parenthood and other abortion providers are claiming a purported 
inability to comply and pointing to clinic closures.300  The judges 
adopting the Balancing Approach primarily have been concerned 
about the potential that some woman will face greater practical diffi-
culties accessing abortion services, and the Balancing Approach has 
simply been the vehicle allowing them to find that those difficulties 
render the laws unconstitutional—despite being analogous to effects 
the Court in Casey signaled as falling short of a substantial obstacle. 
Additionally, in adopting the Balancing Approach the courts have 
side-stepped two important and distinct issues.  The first issue is 
whether practical difficulties such as increases in travel distances and 
 
299 Judge Manion, in a concurring opinion in Van Hollen explained that, in defending the 
admitting privileges law, Wisconsin presented to the court numerous examples of egre-
gious conditions and practices at some abortion clinics, emphasizing in particular the 
practices of Dr. Kermit Gosnell, which garnered national attention and shock just a few 
weeks prior to the enactment of the Wisconsin law.  See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 802–03 
(Manion, J., concurring) (noting that the Gosnell situation revealed use of unlicensed 
employees to conduct gynecological examinations and administer drugs, resulting in the 
death of a patient; instances of physical assault and forced abortion on a minor; leaving 
fetal remains in a woman’s uterus causing excruciating pain; and unclean and bloody fa-
cilities).  Judge Manion appended to the opinion a list of the examples of egregious and 
substandard care by abortion providers that Wisconsin had presented to the court.  Id. at 
807–10.  Judge Manion’s Appendix is included as an appendix to this Article. 
300 The legitimacy of the claims is suspect, of course, given that Planned Parenthood regular-
ly reports annual income in the billions.  For example, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
2014, Planned Parenthood reported an overall income of $1.3 billion.  See Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, 2013–2014 Annual Report:  Our Health. Our Decisions. 
Our Moment., at 19–22, (2014), http://www.plannedparenthood. org/files/6714/1996/
2641/2013-2014_Annual_Report_FINAL_ WEB_VERSION.pdf.  Further, Planned 
Parenthood has recently opened a number of “mega” abortion facilities.  See, e.g., Randal 
K. O’Bannon, Abortion Clinic Closings in Texas—What do they really mean? (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/news/2014/03/abortion-clinic-closings-in-texas-
what-do-they-really-mean/#.VNEzxC79x7Y (reporting that Planned Parenthood had 
opened up more than a dozen giant mega-centers between 2010 and 2014). 
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associated costs can ever rise to level of a substantial obstacle—which 
turns on the nature of the woman’s interest protected by the undue 
burden analysis.  Is it a liberty interest in being able to legally make 
the ultimate decision to terminate a pregnancy previability; or an in-
terest that, in essence, requires states to facilitate abortion through a 
regulatory scheme that ensures ready and easy access to abortion 
providers.  The second issue is whether it is reasonable to view the 
laws as causing the difficulties—as opposed to other factors, such as 
hospital-based decisions to deny staff privileges, or the meager num-
ber of physicians willing to perform abortions.  These issues warrant 
analysis beyond the scope of this Article, and laws furthering legiti-
mate state interests that indirectly result in practical difficulties in ac-
cessing abortion services should not be invalidated absent that careful 
analysis. 
Lastly, another point is worthy of consideration.  In large part the 
courts adopting the Balancing Approach have been reacting to the 
closure of some abortion clinics.  Yet it is reasonable to view those 
closures as an effect that is due, in reality, to the preclusion of abor-
tion-related regulation in the decades following Roe.  That is, the pre-
clusion of abortion regulation allowed Planned Parenthood and oth-
er abortion providers to set up clinics and offer abortion services with 
virtually no regulatory oversight.  If the Court in Roe had exercised 
more restraint and allowed states room to strike the right balance leg-
islatively—the balance between a woman’s liberty interest in terminat-
ing a pregnancy and legitimate state interests—states may well have 
enacted the regulations now emerging in the immediate aftermath of 
Roe.  If so, a possible consequence might have been fewer abortion 
clinics than the number that emerged under Roe’s analytical frame-
work.  If so, it would have been difficult to characterize the state regu-
lations as presenting a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion.  Rather, the very same regulations would have 
been part and parcel of the process for allowing women legal access 
to abortion. 
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APPENDIX 
List of Evidence of Substandard Abortion Care or Practices, 
PREPARED BY JUDGE MANION IN VAN HOLLEN 
APPENDIX TO THE CONCURRENCE 
Dr. Soleiman Soli in Pennsylvania.  See Mark Scolforo, Two Abortion 
Clinics Closed After Reports, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, 
http://www. washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/10/2–abortion–
clinics–closedafter–reports/ (two abortion clinics shut down when in-
spection revealed expired drugs, uncalibrated medical equipment, 
and untrained personnel; a network of abortion care providers de-
scribed the clinics as “women exploiters”). 
Dr. Andrew Rutland in California.  See C. Perkes, Abortion Doctor 
Gives Up License Over Death, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Jan. 25, 2011, 
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/rutland–285561–death–
license.html (woman died where clinic “was not equipped to handle 
emergencies” and the abortion doctor “failed to recognize [an aller-
gic] reaction, adequately attempt resuscitation or promptly call 911.”  
The doctor had previously given up his license “after allegations 
of . . . scaring patients into unnecessary hysterectomies, botching sur-
geries, lying to patients, falsifying medical records, over-prescribing 
painkillers and having sex with a patient in his office.”). 
Dr. Albert Dworkin in Delaware.  See Steven Ertelt, Hearing:  Dela-
ware Abortionist Helped Kermit Gosnell Avoid Law, LIFENEWS, Mar. 16, 
2011, http://www.lifenews. com/2011/03/16/hearing-delaware-
abortionist-helpedkermit-gosnell-avoid-law/ (doctor complicit in 
Kermit Gosnell’s violations has license suspended). 
Dr. James Pendergraft in Florida.  See Steven Ertelt, Abortion Practi-
tioner James Pendergraft Loses Florida License a Fourth Time, LIFENEWS, 
Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.lifenews.com/2009/01/01/state–
5339/(abortion doctor’s license suspended for fourth time for en-
trusting drug administration to unlicensed employee, previous sus-
pensions included a botched abortion that resulted in the unborn 
child being shoved into the abdominal cavity and requiring that the 
woman receive a hysterectomy). 
The Gentilly Medical Clinic for Women and the Hope Medical 
Group for Women in Louisiana.  See Steven Ertelt, Abortion Business in 
Louisiana Loses License for Poor Health, Safety Standards, LIFENEWS, Jan. 
20, 2010, http://www. lifenews.com/ 2010/01/20/state–4743/ (clin-
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ic lost license for operating without trained nurse or proper drug li-
cense); P.J. Smith, Louisiana Abortion Clinic Shut Down for Ignoring 
“Most Basic” Medical Practices, LIFENEWS, Sep. 7, 2011, http://www.
lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2010/sep/10090707 (clinic’s 
operations suspended for failing to observe “the most basic medical 
practices” including “provid[ing] women a physical examination pri-
or to abortions” or “follow[ing] necessary protocols for the admin-
istration of anesthesia and monitoring their clients’ vital signs”). 
Drs. Romeo Ferrer, George Shepard, Leroy Carhart, and Nicola 
Riley in Maryland.  See, respectively, Steven Ertelt, Pro–Lifers Want Mary-
land Practitioner Disciplined, Killed Woman in Botched Abortion, 
LIFENEWS, June 1, 2010, http://www.lifenews.com/2010/06/01/
state–5145/ (“Board of Physician’s Peer Reviewers concluded the 
woman’s death resulted from Ferrer’s failure to meet the standard of 
quality care in violation of state law.”); Steven Ertelt, Troubled Abor-
tion Biz Sees Two Practitioners Lose Medical Licenses, LIFENEWS, 
Sept. 3, 2010, http://www.lifenews.com/2010/09/03/state–5416/ 
(transfer of patient of botched abortion in a rental car to a clinic in 
another state leads to the discovery, and suspension, of two doctors 
circumventing state law); Authorities:  Woman Died from Abortion 
Complications, USA TODAY, June 12, 2013, http:// www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2013/02/21/woman-late-term-abortion-
bled-todeath/1935799/ (Dr. Carhart is under investigation for the 
death of Jennifer Morbelli, a 29 year-old school teacher who under-
went a late-term abortion); The order is available at 
http://abortiondocs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Nicola–
Riley–MD–Permanent–Revocation–May–6–2013.pdf (order perma-
nently revoking Dr. Nicola Riley’s medical license Maryland after she 
failed to call for emergency help for a critically injured abortion pa-
tient and transported her to the hospital in the backseat of a rental 
car). 
Dr. Steven Brigham in Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.  
See N.J. Targets Abortion Doctor Steven Brigham’s License, LEHIGH VALLEY 
LIVE, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/phillip-burg/
index.ssf/2010/09/nj_targets_abortion_doctor_ste.html (New Jersey 
seeks to take doctor’s license after Maryland already took his license 
for risky interstate abortion scheme). 
Dr. Rapin Osathanondh in Massachusetts.  See Denise Lavoie, Doc-
tor Gets 6 Months in Abortion Patient Death, MSNBC, Sep. 14, 2010, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39177186/ns/us_news-crime_and_
courts/t/doctor-gets-months-abortion-patientdeath/ (doctor sen-
tenced to six months in jail for involuntary manslaughter because “he 
failed to monitor [abortion patient] while she was under anesthesia, 
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delayed calling emergency services when her heart stopped, and later 
lied to try to cover up his actions.”). 
Dr. Alberto Hodari in Michigan.  See Schuette Files Suit to Close Unli-
censed Abortion Clinic, Office of the Attorney General, State of Michi-
gan, Mar. 29, 2011, http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7–164–
253426—,00.html (Michigan Attorney General sues to close abortion 
clinic for failing to comply with health and safety rules applicable to 
surgical outpatient facilities). 
Drs. Salomon Epstein and Robert Hosty in New York.  See Steven 
Ertelt, Practitioner Denies He Botched Legal Abortion That Killed Hispanic 
Woman, LIFENEWS, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.lifenews.com/2010/03/
01/state–4858/ (New York police investigate doctor after 37–year–old 
patient dies in botched abortion); http://operationrescue.org/pdfs/
Hosty%20revocation.pdf (eventually, responsibility for the death Dr. 
Epstein was investigated for was attributed to another doctor at the 
clinic, Dr. Hosty, whose license was revoked in this order); South-
western Women’ Options in New Mexico, see Jeremy Kryn, New 911 
Call from New Mexico Abortion Clinic Exposes Pattern of Emergencies, 
LIFENEWS, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/new–
911–call–from–new–mexico-abortion-clinic-exposes-pattern-of-
emergencies (“A recording of a 911 call . . . highlights the continuing 
danger [at] an Albuquerque abortion clinic. . . . The call is the elev-
enth emergency call [from the clinic] in less than two years. . . .” it 
was transcribed as follows, “‘Uh, we have a 31–year–old female who 
underwent an abortion today.  She’s continuing to bleed.  We need 
to transfer her to the hospital, please . . . . The bleeding is persistent. 
It will not stop.’”). 
Dr. Tami Lynn Holst Thorndike in North Dakota.  See Denise 
Burke, North Dakota Abortionist Practices With Expired License, 
AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.aul.org/
2010/11/north-dakota-abortionist-practices-with-expiredlicense/ 
(“[A] North Dakota abortionist is being investigated for practicing 
with an expired license.”). 
Drs. Robert E. Hanson Jr., Margaret Kini, Douglas Karpen, Pedro 
J. Kowalyszyn, Sherwood C. Lynn Jr., Alan Molson, Robert L. Prince, 
H. Brook Randal, Franz Theard, and William W. West, Jr. of Whole 
Women’ Health in Texas.  See Steven Ertelt, Tenth Texas Abortion Prac-
titioner Under State Investigation, LIFENEWS, Aug. 24, 2011, http://www.
lifenews.com/2011/08/24/tenth-texas-abortion-practitioner-under-
state-investigation/ (abortion center investigated for “illegal dumping 
of patient records and medical waste”). 
Dr. Thomas Walter Tucker II in Alabama and Mississippi.  See 
Abortion Doctor Suspended for Improper Drug Storage, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
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Apr. 24, 1994, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1994–04–24/
news/9404240462_1_abortion-doctor-tucker-licensing (Dr. Tucker 
lost his medical license for drug-storage violations, and was subse-
quently found liable for $10 million in a medical malpractice case in-
volving the death of an abortion patient.  See Former Abortion Doctor Or-
dered to Pay $10 Million, SUN HERALD, Dec. 8, 1996, 1996 WLNR 
256209). 
Dr. Mi Yong Kim in New York and Virginia.  See Operation Rescue, 
Troubled Virginia Abortion Clinic Puts Bleeding Botched Abortion Patient in 
Hospital, LIFESITENEWS, Apr. 20, 2012, http://www.lifesitenews.com/
news/troubled-virginia-abortion-clinic-putsbleeding-botched-
abortion-patient-in/ (patient put in hospital after abortion at clinic 
run by a doctor whose license had been surrendered.  The surrender 
order available at http://abortiondocs.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/04/KimVALicense-Surrender05182007. pdf.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
